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willardguy
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submarine in san felipe
remember back in may a nomad was reminiscing about a submarine in san felipe, david I think kind of remembered it. anyway i was just reading about the
army corp of engineers building a road to san felipe and building a submarine watch station during WWII. I guess we were worried about submarines
steaming up the colorado river??? anyone know anything about this???
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willardguy
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this all ties in with the german plan to blow up hoover dam! that mystery sub in san felipe is key. If you want a really fun read on this:
http://the-wanderling.com/hoover_dam.html
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Ateo
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Wow. Didn't read the whole thing yet, but I will. Very interesting!
| Quote: | Originally posted by willardguy
this all ties in with the german plan to blow up hoover dam! that mystery sub in san felipe is key. If you want a really fun read on this:
http://the-wanderling.com/hoover_dam.html |
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Ken Cooke
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Mood: Pole Line Road postponed due to injury
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Read this!
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sancho
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Rember reading something re: that, just guessing,
seems they may have put the lookout on Punta
Machorro (sp?), the butte at the n. end of San Felipe,
I beleive it is 900' or so. I suppose there were no
dams on the Colo except Hoover. A catamaran may
not find enough draft to make it up to Mexicali
now
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Jim/Liisa
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Location: San Felipe (South Campos)
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| Quote: | Originally posted by willardguy
this all ties in with the german plan to blow up hoover dam! that mystery sub in san felipe is key. If you want a really fun read on this:
http://the-wanderling.com/hoover_dam.html |
Awful large sub U133 to be anywhere near San Felipe on the sea of Cotez let alone snaking through to the Colorado River
http://uboat.net/boats/u133.htm[/url]
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David K
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I posted here about the radar station the United States installed at (near) San Felipe and other points in northern Baja to watch for approaching Jap.
ships or aircraft. We also built may of Baja's runways for our pilots to use when scouting for invaders (Ensenada, El Rosario, Valle de Trinidad were
named). As Ken posted, we built the service road to install and maintain a telephone line from Ensenada to San Felipe to communicate with the radar
base.
I will try and dig those posts up...
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bajaguy
Elite Nomad
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Mood: must be 5 O'clock somewhere in Baja
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| Quote: | Originally posted by Jim/Liisa
Awful large sub U133 to be anywhere near San Felipe on the sea of Cotez let alone snaking through to the Colorado River
http://uboat.net/boats/u133.htm[/url] |
Sounds like somebody has been hitting the Schnapps pretty hard 
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David K
Honored Nomad
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1940's: Baja in WWII
Mexico and the Defense of California
American concern for the security of Mexico was intimately related to the extent and proximity of any threat to United States territory. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the security of Baja California became a matter of acute interest to the United States. Just as lend-lease was a manifestation
of American interest in the security of Mexico, so the measures taken by General DeWitt and General Card##as, singly and jointly for the defense of
the United States' southwest and Mexico's northwest were concrete expressions of Mexican cooperation in the defense of the United States.
There were three fields of activity in which the defense of California involved joint action with Mexico: first, the placing of aircraft detector
stations in Baja California; second, the building of airfields and highways there; and third, the formulation of joint plans by General DeWitt and
General Card##as.
The proposal to establish radar stations in Baja California grew out of a study made by the GHQ Air Force early in 1941, disclosing that vital areas
in the southwest, near the Mexican boundary, could not be adequately covered either by a ground observation system or by radar detectors in American
territory.
"An enemy desiring to attack Southern California," a later Air Forces report stated, "may be expected to be aware of the limitations of our Aircraft
Warning Service, and will make his approach over or from Mexican territory. " 74 The Air Forces therefore recommended taking steps to obtain Mexico's
permission to establish at least two detector stations in Baja California.
These views were brought to the attention of the War Plans Division sometime in April. Without denying the merits of the proposal, the War Plans
Division informed the Army Air Forces that the moment was not propitious for discussing the subject with the Mexican staff representatives, then in
Washington.
The Air Forces continued to agitate the matter during the next three months, only to receive the same reply: "The War Department considers it
inadvisable to submit to the Mexican representatives a request to station detachments of U.S. Army armed and uniformed forces in Mexican territory, as
it is convinced that the Mexican Government would reject such a request at this time." 75 In framing the War Plans Division reply, Colonel Ridgway,
then serving as one of the American staff representatives, noted, "there is no probability of securing Mexican consent . . . at least until an Axis
attack is delivered or imminent." 76
No action was taken until 3 December 1941, four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the American staff representatives presented their
Mexican colleagues with a proposal for an immediate reconnaissance of Sonora and Baja California for the purpose of locating sites for radar stations.
Although it was agreed that the necessity of using the installations might never arise, the American representatives nevertheless proposed that the
preliminary steps be taken at once and that small mixed groups of United States officers and Mexicans, in civilian clothes, should survey the area
within two hundred miles of the border for access roads and radar sites.77
An appeal on 8 December brought a reply from President Avila Camacho the same day giving full permission to make the reconnaissance and install the
radar stations. To the original purpose the Air Staff had, however, added that of investigating rumors of Japanese airfields and fuel caches. A
separate party under Maj. A. P. Ebright conducted the Air Staff survey, entering Mexico on 16 December. An attempt by the War Department to identify
the Ebright mission with the radar station reconnaissance no doubt contributed to the initial confusion and suspicion that attended it.78
Although no signs of enemy activity were uncovered, the Ebright party remained in Mexico until the end of January to investigate suitable sites for
landing fields, to report on the availability of water and other supplies along the route of communications from the border south, and in general to
add to the Army's store of information about the area.79 As the immediate post-Pearl Harbor frenzy subsided and as the scope and positions of the
Ebright mission became clarified,
[357]
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General DeWitt's Western Defense Command headquarters gave it firmer support against the continued skepticism at the headquarters of the Southern
California Sector.80 Meanwhile, other groups had crossed the border, and had tentatively chosen sites for radar detector stations at Punta
Salispuedes, 20 miles northwest of Ensenada; Punta San Jacinto, 125 miles south of Ensenada; and Punta Diggs on the northeast coast of the peninsula.
With all this activity going on, the issue that had threatened the negotiations over staging fields the previous summer-whether Mexico would permit
the entry and stationing of armed and uniformed American soldiers promised to become a hardy perennial. On the earlier occasion, it had been solved by
accepting the Mexican position, and when the proposal for the reconnaissance of Baja California was presented to the staff representatives on 3
December the wearing of civilian clothes by the soldiers making the survey was accepted by the American representatives as inescapable.
The first draft of the instructions for `the reconnaissance, drawn up on 9 December for the Chief of the Army Air Forces, stated, "United States
personnel will be limited to officers and they will wear civilian clothing," but at the suggestion of G-2, and with the concurrence of Colonel
Ridgway, this particular restriction was deleted.81
Because of the United States' belligerent status, it was no longer appropriate. General DeWitt was especially insistent that no soldiers cross into
Mexico unless in uniform and armed, but the point was not raised with Mexican representatives in Washington.
Consequently, the Ebright group was turned back at the border and not permitted to cross until the men changed into civilian clothing and left their
weapons behind. Sometimes, depending on the attitude of the local Mexican commanders, American parties were permitted to enter the country in uniform,
but never under arms, and not even the excellent personal relations that existed between General DeWitt and General Card##as could bring about a
definite acceptance of the American view.
The War Department as well as the Department of State took the position that, unsatisfactory though it might be to send American soldiers into Mexico
in civilian clothes and without arms, to arrive at an impasse with Mexico and risk having permission to install the radar sets refused would be even
more undesirable.
Accordingly, on 20 December General DeWitt was authorized to accede to Mexican wishes in the matter. His efforts to obtain a less dangerous and more
face-saving solution continued but met with slight success.82 After the summer of 1942 this particular issue ceased to be a matter of record. The
establishment of the radar stations, a diminution of American activity in Baja California, and the withdrawal of American personnel were probably
responsible.
Two of the radar stations were set up and began operations during the first week in June 1942 and the third a month later. At each, one officer and
twenty-five enlisted men were stationed to operate the set and train Mexican military personnel in its use.
The equipment itself was turned over to the Mexican Army under lend-lease. By the end of August the Mexican troops had taken over the operation of the
sets, and the Americans had withdrawn except for a small detachment of five men and one officer at each station.83
The coverage provided by the three sets was far from complete, but even as early as October 1942 the War Department was breathing more easily and saw
no need to install additional equipment. 84
By the summer of 1943 retrenchment had become the order of the day in Baja California. All Americans were withdrawn from the radar stations except for
one officer and three enlisted men, who were left in Ensenada primarily for liaison purposes. All requests for additional equipment had to be refused.
By mid-May 1944 the Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, reported that he no longer considered the three radar stations necessary for the defense of
California and, much to the dismay of both Navies, who wished to have the sets in operation for air-sea rescue work, operations ceased about the first
of June.
When, at a meeting of the defense commission, Admiral Johnson protested against a Mexican Army proposal to move the equipment to Mexico City, General
Henry was obliged to state that the War Department's policy of retrenchment remained unchanged but that there would be no objection to the Navy's
supplying and maintaining the operation of the sets.
For the remainder of the war, the Army had no further responsibility in the matter. One station resumed operation with gasoline and oil supplied by
the Navy. The other two were moved away.85
During the two years they had been in operation, the stations performed a useful function. They had closed all but a small gap in the network around
the San Diego-Los Angeles area. Anticipated language difficulties failed to materialize to any great extent, and valuable training in the use of
highly technical equipment was given our Mexican ally.
As part of the general scheme of filling in the gaps in the defenses of California after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Air Force had strongly
urged the building of three landing fields for pursuit planes in Baja California and two staging fields, one near Rosario and the other near La Paz.
Time, and authority to use the fields for operations, were the important considerations. Both the War Department and the joint defense commission,
when formally constituted, were agreed upon the desirability of the proposal, which the commission adopted as its Fourth Recommendation on 10 April
1942.86
After some backing and filling a joint survey got well under way and recommended three sites as primary airdromes-El Cipres, six miles south of
Ensenada; Camalu, just south of San Jacinto; and Trinidad, about eighteen miles south of La Ventura. 87
Later, four other fields were surveyed. For three weeks at the end of June and in early July the War Department, on the advice of the joint defense
commission, called a halt to all activity in connection with the airfields in order to give Mexican opinion time to crystallize and to give General
Card##as an opportunity to make a decision.
After authority was given to proceed with the plans and estimates for the original five airfields, General Card##as and especially General Juan Felipe
Rico, the local Mexican commander, took hold of the project with enthusiasm and pushed not only the airfields but also a connecting highway down the
peninsula.
General DeWitt promised any help in materials and equipment that General Rico might need. The United States, General DeWitt thought, was committed to
assist both projects, the roads as well as the airfields.88
By the beginning of 1943, the War Department had begun to cool, although the Fourth Air Force still urged that the three northern fields, at El
Cipres, Camalu, and Trinidad, be constructed and tied to San Diego by connecting roads. In March the War Department rejected General Rico's request
for materials and equipment for the construction of the airfields.
The Mexican section of the joint commission thus found itself in the position, in August, of arguing in favor of the United States Army undertaking a
defense construction project on Mexican soil, while the American section was opposed. With the War Department unwilling to provide the construction
materials because of the urgent needs of more active theaters of operations, the discussion became academic.89
In the field of joint planning, the Mexican experience took a contrary course to that of Canadian-United States planning. In the case of the latter a
basic plan was drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board, and local joint plans, more detailed and specific, were subsequently completed in accordance
with its general principles.
With Mexico, on the other hand, the only joint plan completed during the war was the DeWitt-Card##as plan of February-March 1942 for the defense of
the Pacific coastal region. When later the joint defense commission undertook to draw up a plan, two of the members-Admiral Johnson and General
Castillo Najera-understood that the commission was supposed to base its plan on the DeWitt-Card##as agreements.
A casual observer would perhaps have seen little in the local situation to indicate much success for the Western Defense Command planners. The local
Mexican commanders either were uncertain of their authority to commit the federal government or were reluctant to accept instructions from Mexico
City; the difficulties and delays in obtaining full permission for a reconnaissance in Baja California were inauspicious. But such an observer would
have been wrong. Actually, the Mexican commanders made clear their willingness and desire to cooperate, and if they were reluctant to place their
names to a document committing them to joint action, they made it plain by word of mouth that in an emergency they would call on General DeWitt to
send American troops into Mexico.
In its final shape the plan represented a compromise between an earlier draft drawn up by General DeWitt's headquarters and one presented by General
Card##as.90 It provided for the patrol and defense of the two coastal areas-Mexican and American-by the forces of the respective countries, for an
exchange of information between the two forces, and for the passage of troops of either country through the territory of the other; and it permited
the forces of either country to operate in the other, in uniform and under arms. There were several provisions that failed to meet with the approval
of General Card##as.
The Mexican commander could not agree to the control and operation of airfields and radar stations in Mexico by American personnel, and insisted that
the forces of one country operating in the territory of the other be under the commander in whose area they were operating.91
Both generals agreed that the plan was sound from a "military standpoint" and that "the question from a nationalistic standpoint is one for the
decision of the two governments." 92 The points on which the two commanders could not agree were accordingly turned over to the joint defense
commission.
The American section thought it best to defer consideration of a general, basic plan until such specific matters as the radar stations and airfields
were agreed upon, and when the draft of a basic plan was presented by Col. Lemuel Mathewson at the meeting of 21 April 1942, it was patterned after
the Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan of 1940.93
Little progress had been made when Admiral Johnson, becoming chairman of the American section, suggested a fresh start and a new approach. This was in
December 1942. The new scheme-to draw up a plan of collaboration, in ratification of the agreements reached by the commission, instead of a defense
plan-was no more easily agreed upon than the old.
General Henry, recently appointed senior Army member, took over the job of drafting a new plan in collaboration with General Alamillo of the Mexican
section. Discussion during the meetings the following summer and fall reveal what seem to be a measure of impatience and perhaps satiation. The
question of command proved to be the stumbling block, and by April 1944 General Henry was ready to abandon the attempt to write an acceptable plan.
Finally, after more than two years of effort, the commission decided upon a "statement of general principles . . . which might serve as a basis for
other plans of collaboration between any two nations." 94
In a broader sense, the wartime collaboration between the United States and Mexico cannot be measured adequately by the activity in Baja California,
by the joint planning of General DeWitt and General Card##as, by the deliberations of the defense commission, or by the airfields provided from
Tampico to Tapachula. All of these might well have created dissension. But from the early wartime experience came a closer bond between the two
countries.
The commendable combat record of the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron on Luzon, the Mexican airmen who gave their lives in the same cause for which
American fliers died, these were the true measure of the cooperation that began in 1941.
There were indications that ties so strongly forged would not be lightly dropped. Although the joint defense commission had not been formally
designated as a permanent body, plans were made at a staff conference in March 1945, at which the American members of the commission represented the
United States, to continue the defense commission in the postwar years. The mutual confidence and respect between the two countries that developed out
of their wartime association are proof that the New World can still serve as a beacon for the Old.
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From Gene Kira's MexFish.com
MILK RUN” (LITERALLY)
“The first trip I made to San Felipe in Mexico was to deliver dairy products to the Army radar station in the spring of 1942.
“Sometime, in about April I think, my dad pulled me out of the second grade, and we got into a 1938 Dodge truck and headed for San Felipe.
“The truck was filled with milk, butter, eggs, cheese and ice cream and we were headed for the army ‘base’ at San Felipe.
“Because of the war, there was a 35 m.p.h. speed limit, and we spent the night at Calexico, at the Anza Hotel, I think.
“We got up early the next morning. I don't remember having to stop going in either direction at the border. We crossed at Calexico and it was marked
as the border, but I don't think there was any official border activity.
“We were not far out of town, across the border, when we were stopped at the first of maybe four check points before we reached San Felipe. These
stops were manned by American soldiers, not Mexicans.
“My dad explained that we were going to a military installation in San Felipe that had just been built, and what it did was listen for airplanes using
something called ‘radar.’ In the last six months, the Army had built a paved road to San Felipe called the ‘radar road’ which made the drive south a
lot easier than it had been, unlike the month-long ordeal of mud and flood up until 1942.
“What we drive on today is the ‘radar road,’ although it has been paved a couple of times since then.
“I may be the only person to remember driving on that stretch of road during World War II who is still alive today. I can remember, the water was
right up to the road's edge in places, and my dad said that if it were not for the road, we'd have to wait for the tides to change and for the mud to
dry out.
“The ‘base’ was near where the old icehouse was until recently, and we were stopped from driving into the main area. About 20 young soldiers came out
to the barbed-wire fence and had the truck unloaded in a very short time, and we turned right around and headed home.”
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American WWII Air Defense Radar Stations
(1942 - 1943), State of Baja California (Norte)
During the early years of WWII the U.S. Army built and manned at least three SCR-270 early warning anti-aircraft radar stations along the coast of
Baja California Norte, operated by the 654th AWS Company, to protect the southern approaches to San Diego, California.
Known sites include Station B-92 at Punta Salispuedes, located 22 miles northwest of Ensenada (later moved to Alasitos, 36 miles south of Tijuana);
Station B-94 at Punta San Jacinto, 60 miles south of Ensenada; and Station B-97 at Punta Estrella (Diggs), south of San Felipe on the Gulf of
California (aka Sea of Cortez).
==============================================
(DK personal note):
When I was younger, I also had heard that the radar station was out at Punta Estrella/ Punta Diggs. The MexFish post says it was near the ice house in
San Felipe...?
The type of radar installed in Baja... an SCR-268:
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Arrangements were made between the U.S. Government and the Government of Mexico to allow joint teams of U.S. Army officers and Mexicans Army officers
and soldiers to patrol the Mexican peninsula of Baja California. The teams were platoon-size units and patrolled all the way to the southern tip of
the peninsula.
There were persistent rumors early in the war that the Japanese might have secret air bases in Baja California, but no evidence of this was ever
found. The American officers were required to wear civilian clothing and all U.S. markings had to be removed from U.S. Army vehicles and other
equipment to accommodate Mexico's neutrality laws.
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More...
MEXICO 197
AWS Detachment 1 B-92 654th SAW Company
Signal Aircraft Warning (US) Punta Salispuedes, 22 miles northwest of Ensenada (moved to Alasitos, 36 miles south of Tijuana) Mexico
AWS Detachment 2 B-94 654th SAW Company
Punta San Jacinto, 60 miles South of Ensenada
AWS Detachment 3 B-97 654th SAW Company
Punta Estrella, near San Felipe on the Gulf
(Also called Punta Diggs198 199 )
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Jim/Liisa
Nomad
Posts: 192
Registered: 2-5-2011
Location: San Felipe (South Campos)
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| Quote: | Originally posted by bajaguy
| Quote: | Originally posted by Jim/Liisa
Awful large sub U133 to be anywhere near San Felipe on the sea of Cotez let alone snaking through to the Colorado River
http://uboat.net/boats/u133.htm[/url] |
Sounds like somebody has been hitting the Schnapps pretty hard
Sober up your self read below from the same artical...
General notes on this boat
Myth involving this boat
There is a great U-boat myth that involves this boat. According to an article from 1996 her last mission was to travel up the Colorado River from Baja
California and destroy the Hoover Dam. The article is from the USS Shaw's newsletter. The article states that U-133, piloted by Captain Peter Pfau
along with 54 sailors made it to as far as Laughlin, Nevada before sandbars made them abort their mission and scuttle the sub.
This is only a cute story, she never would have made it that far (see map showing its approximate path from St. Nazaire, a suitable base, to the
target) as its fuel supply would never have allowed this (not even close, the type VIIC could make it to the US east coast by filling up part of its
water tanks with fuel but even then it was stretching it). There was also no U-boat commander named Pfau. Had such an unsual and daring raid been
attempted during the war, people would talk and we would know about it by now.
hard |
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64837
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Location: San Diego County
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Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Anyone here have parents or grand parents who witnessed the attempted attack on Los Angeles, that was hushed by FDR... How about the blowing up of a
fuel depot, near Santa Barbara??
People talk, but it doesn't always make the print!
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bufeo
Senior Nomad
Posts: 793
Registered: 11-16-2003
Location: Santa Fe New Mexico
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| Quote: | Originally posted by David K
Anyone here have parents or grand parents who witnessed the attempted attack on Los Angeles, that was hushed by FDR... How about the blowing up of a
fuel depot, near Santa Barbara??
People talk, but it doesn't always make the print! |
Are you asking about the twenty-minute shelling of the oil pumping station at Ellwood February 23, 1942? If so, it was reported on the front page of
the Santa Barbara News-Press the next morning on the 24th.
Allen R
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bajaguy
Elite Nomad
Posts: 9247
Registered: 9-16-2003
Location: Carson City, NV/Ensenada - Baja Country Club
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Mood: must be 5 O'clock somewhere in Baja
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| Quote: | Originally posted by David K
Anyone here have parents or grand parents who witnessed the attempted attack on Los Angeles, that was hushed by FDR... How about the blowing up of a
fuel depot, near Santa Barbara??
People talk, but it doesn't always make the print! |
And most people talk about the wrong thing............no cover up on this, and no black helicopters. Submarine attack with a deck gun............
Or maybe it's this attack on Los Angeles.....
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1941_(film)
[Edited on 6-29-2012 by bajaguy]
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willardguy
Elite Nomad
Posts: 6451
Registered: 9-19-2009
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well we do have at least two nomads that saw a submarine in san felipe! somewhere somehow somebodys gotta have a picture of this sub??
After talking about the mock-up battleship that had been given the name Muroc Maru, a Chief Petty Officer stepped into the conversation and told me
that toward the end of World War II there was an actual REAL German submarine that used to be out on the dry lake. They had taken all the heavy parts
like the motors and batteries out of it as well as all the secret stuff, then bombed and straffed the hull and conning tower over and over in target
practice until all that was left was a few small hunks of metal and a couple of guages with German writing on them. Then he said, in September or
October of 1947 there was a huge rainstorm that flooded the lake with 5 or 6 inches of water and turned the lake bed into a sloppy mess. All the
pieces that were left on the surface sank into the stuff.
The Chief said he could prove it because he was on a team that dug up some of the parts and that he had kept a few pieces back as souvenirs. He said a
few years after the rainstorm some intelligence whoop-de-doo in Washington got a hair up his ass that the sub should have had a brass plate with some
numbers on it screwed on some bulkhead and they wanted that plate. When they learned the sub had been blown to bits and laying all over the dry lake
bottom they put together a team to see if the plate could be found, of which, again because he had been a onetime submariner, the Chief was a member.
After a few days with mine detectors, digging holes all over and tip-toeing around unexploded ordinace, they gave up. The weekend after the Chief told
the story he came in with a bag full of pieces of copper tubing and small brass pipes, one with a guage attached that had German writing on it and
threw it on the table in front of everybody saying the stuff was part of the booty from the dig he had been on. After that I wanted to know everything
about the submarine. Everytime I saw him I him asked more and more questions. Pretty soon he started to avoid me or just did not show up. He did tell
me a few interesting things, like for example, even though he was a submariner, it was in conjuction with the sub that he heard the word "snorkle" for
the first time.
One day just as I was about to leave the ranch for the summer the Chief came to me and said there was a man he wanted me to meet. Parked out in the
shade under a row of cottonwood trees along the entrance to the main ranch facilities was a bright, shiny brand new '52 or '53 Chevrolet pick-up
truck. The driver got out as the Chief and I walked up, leaving an older man wearing a drop-rim Panama style straw hat sitting alone on the passenger
side. The Chief, after motioning me to see the passenger, joined the driver as they walked toward the bar. When I stepped up to the the door of the
truck the man in the hat never looked at me, continuing to stare out through the windshield and over the hood all the time I was there. He asked, "Why
do you want to know so much about the submarine, boy?" I told him I just thought it was weird that a submarine was out in the middle of the desert.
He told me the submarine was German. It had been towed behind another sub to an island in the Sea of Cortez, arriving sometime late in the year 1944
and hiding in a cove until it received a "go" signal. Where it started from he did not know. When the sub left the island it headed on it's own power
up the mouth of the Colorado River with a skeleton crew.[5] It was when the sub reached a point on the river called Laguna Dam, 12 miles North of
Yuma, that he came into the picture. He belonged to a work crew made up of predominently German men whose job it was was to pull the sub out of the
river, disassemble it into five parts, load the parts onto trailers and truck it north to a designated spot beyond Parker Dam. There they were to
reassemble it and disappear. Although the sub would not have been able to have traversed the river any farther north than Laguna Dam anyway, the dam
was selected to be where the sub was dismantled because the whole of the facade across the dam's bridge had swastikas recessed an inch-and-a-half into
the heavy concrete, and the powers that be who set the mission into motion viewed if not a sign from heaven, at least a positive omen in an occult
sort of way.
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BeemerDan
Nomad
Posts: 187
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Location: Port Orchard Wa
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Laguna Dam
http://smotor.com/flooddam/swastika.htm
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motoged
Elite Nomad
Posts: 6481
Registered: 7-31-2006
Location: Kamloops, BC
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Mood: Gettin' Better
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Bad link....
Don't believe everything you think....
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willardguy
Elite Nomad
Posts: 6451
Registered: 9-19-2009
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64837
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Before Hitler used it, it was just a design... I presume the bridge is from pre-N-zi Germany years?!
Things change over time... I believe the monks of Tibet used the symbol as did American Indians.
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J.P.
Super Nomad
Posts: 1673
Registered: 7-8-2010
Location: Punta Banda
Member Is Offline
Mood: Easy Does It
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| Quote: | Originally posted by David K
Before Hitler used it, it was just a design... I presume the bridge is from pre-N-zi Germany years?!
Things change over time... I believe the monks of Tibet used the symbol as did American Indians. |
We were in Acapulco In May 1979 and watched a parade where Some of the marchers carried Swastcas on banners and another group had the Hammer and Cycle
and a banner that said Comminust Workers Party Union
The Swastci dates back to anchient Indian times(not american:lol it is said to mean To Be GOOD.
[Edited on 7-1-2012 by J.P.]
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BeemerDan
Nomad
Posts: 187
Registered: 1-13-2011
Location: Port Orchard Wa
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Noob dummy
Sorry about the bad link MotoGed, I'm a total noob to this, BTW I enjoyed your ride reports. I met the group riding this past year that did the bus
ride, and the year before saw the broken BMW 650 strapped to the back of the blue bus at R&B This year i was riding my Kawi super sherpa, Cool
guys from Canada riding from Kamloops!
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