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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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The 2013 Baja Pole Line Run
Drivers Meeting outside of the MICK compound - Rio Hardy, Baja California
from left - MICK's brother-in-law SCOTT, MICK, Russ, Marco, Chris, and Ken
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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Crossing the muddy Laguna Salada River - Scott leading with MICK
Russell crossing the Laguna Salada River - the El Mayor Mountains in the background.
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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Posing with all of our vehicles across the deep, muddy crossing of the Laguna Salada River
Traveling along the route to Cohabuzo Junction near the vineyard.
Russell standing outside of his 230,000 mi. Jeep Wrangler!
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Bajafun777
Super Nomad
Posts: 1103
Registered: 9-13-2006
Location: Rosarito & California
Member Is Offline
Mood: Enjoying Life with Wife In Mexico, Easy on The Easy
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Some great photos and good information about your trip. Ken, I am surprised during your moment while crossing the border you did not have several
venders at both windows trying to sell you something getting into your video!LOL Well, at least the break in the waiting helps and you always have
the large photos on the fence put up by Mexico to share some history moments too! Take care and keep finding and having FUN in Baja! Take Care
& Travel Safe---"No Hurry, No Worry, Just FUN" bajafun777
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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Driving along the Baja Pole Line Road
'CG' and MICK
The sun setting against the Sierra Juarez mountains
Our group traveling the trail against a setting sun
Setting up camp in the Cañon Enmedio
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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Tackling the Baja Pole Line Road
Ascending the challenging Basketball Hill.
SCOTT and Gaila
Marco and daughter Jessica
Russell and 'Ziggy'
Driving along an off-camber section - NOT FOR THE FAINT OF HEART
Driving down the 'Bad Hill' as Neal Johns described it in his writings for Discover Baja - Chris Glass and son Noe make it look easy in their Tijuana
Jeep (TJ Wrangler)
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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Traveling down another washed out section of the Baja Pole Line Road
Russell dropping into the massive Arroyo Grande
END OF THE RUN!!
Our group met for dinner at Campo Mosqueda along the Rio Hardy River in Baja California. Here is Gaila, Jessica, Leidys, and Penny.
MICK took our group up the Rio Hardy in his Mastercraft boat
MICK, Ken, 'CG', Marco, and Noe enjoying the ride.
Nomad 'CG' at the controls
Noe at the controls! 
The 2013 Baja Pole Line Group - SCOTT, Gaila, MICK, Penny, Russ, Ken, Leidys, Marco, Jessica, Chris, Noe
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64514
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Thanks Ken!
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TMW
Select Nomad
Posts: 10659
Registered: 9-1-2003
Location: Bakersfield, CA
Member Is Offline
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The Too Much Fun Club.
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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We had a great time!
Russ after filling his tank for only $3.49/gallon!
Waiting to cross the border at the Calexico Point-of-Entry
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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Just in...from MICK's Sister-in-Law Gayla
The desert was in FULL BLOOM as seen by these photos!
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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...more from Gayla and Scott
MICK making it look easy in his Ford Ranger
Wildflowers surround a Baja pin cushion
The Ocotillo had blooming red flowers atop!
Colorful!
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Ateo
Elite Nomad
Posts: 5849
Registered: 7-18-2011
Member Is Offline
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Nice photos as I previously stated. How did the BFG AT TA's hold up? Someday I shall get a vehicle able to do the pole line.
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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Back on the trail...with Gayla, Scott, Marco, Jessica, and Russ
Jessica and Marco + Russell
Jessica and Marco traveling down the steep and rocky trail
Scott had a wonderful time on the trail in his 'Rover!
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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| Quote: | Originally posted by Ateo
Nice photos as I previously stated. How did the BFG AT TA's hold up? Someday I shall get a vehicle able to do the pole line.
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I was amazed, but my BFG's held up much better than I had expected them to. There was a little bit of chunking of the tread, but the chunking was
minimal. My traction in the 35" size was incredible - as good as, or better than a 33" Mud-Terrain tire (if you can believe that).
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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From the lens of Nomad 'CG'
The El Mayor Mountains
Approaching the Laguna Salada and Laguna Salada River
Our 2013 Pole Line Group - parked at the Laguna Salada River
Parked on the Laguna Salada playa
Boating with MICK
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8921
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Black Trans Lives Matter
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| Quote: | Originally posted by edm1
Great report, great photos.
How does one get past this section?
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This area contains a go-around where you have to scale the side of the hill to the right. I am not sure a vehicle of your size would get hung up or
not.
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durrelllrobert
Elite Nomad
Posts: 7393
Registered: 11-22-2007
Location: Punta Banda BC
Member Is Offline
Mood: thriving in Baja
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| Quote: | Originally posted by TW
The Too Much Fun Club. |
Why is it called Pole Line"? I saw no poles in any of the photos.
Technically the pole of a line L in a circle C is a point P that is the inversion in C of the point Q on L that is closest to the center of the
circle. Conversely, the polar line (or polar) of a point P in a circle C is the line L such that its closest point Q to the circle is the inversion of
P in C.
It could also refer to Polish line dancing?
www.youtube.com/watch?v=q7SB4tzzunM
[Edited on 4-13-2013 by durrelllrobert]
[Edited on 4-13-2013 by durrelllrobert]
Bob Durrell
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64514
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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| Quote: | Originally posted by durrelllrobert
| Quote: | Originally posted by TW
The Too Much Fun Club. |
Why is it called Pole Line"? I saw no poles in any of the photos.
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Ken posted this a couple years ago:
In 1942, President Eisenhower asked the Mexican Government if a road could be built that would connect the border region to the tip of Baja
California. This was to surpress any German and/or Japanese submarine activity which could have presented a problem in our nations Southwest. This
idea was balked at, due to the enormity of the task, manpower, and the amount of money this would have cost. So instead, a telephone line road linking
Ensenada to San Felipe was constructed. Mexican and American soldiers would man a small outpost in San Felipe, Mexico – notifying American soldiers of
any Axis powers attempting to invade the United States via the Colorado River. The Baja Pole Line Road was built within one year - at the same exact
time as the Alaskan Highway.
[I think he intended to say 'General' Eisenhower?]
Here is more on the American radar station near San Felipe, from the Internet:
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Mexico and the Defense of California
American concern for the security of Mexico was intimately related to the extent and proximity of any threat to United States territory. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the security of Baja California became a matter of acute interest to the United States. Just as lend-lease was a manifestation
of American interest in the security of Mexico, so the measures taken by General DeWitt and General Card##as, singly and jointly for the defense of
the United States' southwest and Mexico's northwest were concrete expressions of Mexican cooperation in the defense of the United States.
There were three fields of activity in which the defense of California involved joint action with Mexico: first, the placing of aircraft detector
stations in Baja California; second, the building of airfields and highways there; and third, the formulation of joint plans by General DeWitt and
General Card##as.
The proposal to establish radar stations in Baja California grew out of a study made by the GHQ Air Force early in 1941, disclosing that vital areas
in the southwest, near the Mexican boundary, could not be adequately covered either by a ground observation system or by radar detectors in American
territory. "An enemy desiring to attack Southern California," a later Air Forces report stated, "may be expected to be aware of the limitations of our
Aircraft Warning Service, and will make his approach over or from Mexican territory. " 74 The Air Forces therefore recommended taking steps to obtain
Mexico's permission to establish at least two detector stations in Baja California. These views were brought to the attention of the War Plans
Division sometime in April. Without denying the merits of the proposal, the War Plans Division informed the Army Air Forces that the moment was not
propitious for discussing the subject with the Mexican staff representatives, then in Wash-
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ington. The Air Forces continued to agitate the matter during the next three months, only to receive the same reply: "The War Department considers it
inadvisable to submit to the Mexican representatives a request to station detachments of U.S. Army armed and uniformed forces in Mexican territory, as
it is convinced that the Mexican Government would reject such a request at this time." 75 In framing the War Plans Division reply, Colonel Ridgway,
then serving as one of the American staff representatives, noted, "there is no probability of securing Mexican consent . . . at least until an Axis
attack is delivered or imminent." 76
No action was taken until 3 December 1941, four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the American staff representatives presented their
Mexican colleagues with a proposal for an immediate reconnaissance of Sonora and Baja California for the purpose of locating sites for radar stations.
Although it was agreed that the necessity of using the installations might never arise, the American representatives nevertheless proposed that the
preliminary steps be taken at once and that small mixed groups of United States officers and Mexicans, in civilian clothes, should survey the area
within two hundred miles of the border for access roads and radar sites.77 An appeal on 8 December brought a reply from President Avila Camacho the
same day giving full permission to make the reconnaissance and install the radar stations. To the original purpose the Air Staff had, however, added
that of investigating rumors of Japanese airfields and fuel caches. A separate party under Maj. A. P. Ebright conducted the Air Staff survey, entering
Mexico on 16 December. An attempt by the War Department to identify the Ebright mission with the radar station reconnaissance no doubt contributed to
the initial confusion and suspicion that attended it.78 Although no signs of enemy activity were uncovered, the Ebright party remained in Mexico until
the end of January to investigate suitable sites for landing fields, to report on the availability of water and other supplies along the route of
communications from the border south, and in general to add to the Army's store of information about the area.79 As the immediate post-Pearl Harbor
frenzy subsided and as the scope and positions of the Ebright mission became clarified,
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General DeWitt's Western Defense Command headquarters gave it firmer support against the continued skepticism at the headquarters of the Southern
California Sector.80 Meanwhile, other groups had crossed the border, and had tentatively chosen sites for radar detector stations at Punta
Salispuedes, 20 miles northwest of Ensenada; Punta San Jacinto, 125 miles south of Ensenada; and Punta Diggs on the northeast coast of the peninsula.
With all this activity going on, the issue that had threatened the negotiations over staging fields the previous summer-whether Mexico would permit
the entry and stationing of armed and uniformed American soldiers promised to become a hardy perennial. On the earlier occasion, it had been solved by
accepting the Mexican position, and when the proposal for the reconnaissance of Baja California was presented to the staff representatives on 3
December the wearing of civilian clothes by the soldiers making the survey was accepted by the American representatives as inescapable. The first
draft of the instructions for `the reconnaissance, drawn up on 9 December for the Chief of the Army Air Forces, stated, "United States personnel will
be limited to officers and they will wear civilian clothing," but at the suggestion of G-2, and with the concurrence of Colonel Ridgway, this
particular restriction was deleted.81 Because of the United States' belligerent status, it was no longer appropriate. General DeWitt was especially
insistent that no soldiers cross into Mexico unless in uniform and armed, but the point was not raised with Mexican representatives in Washington.
Consequently, the Ebright group was turned back at the border and not permitted to cross until the men changed into civilian clothing and left their
weapons behind. Sometimes, depending on the attitude of the local Mexican commanders, American parties were permitted to enter the country in uniform,
but never under arms, and not even the excellent personal relations that existed between General DeWitt and General Card##as could bring about a
definite acceptance of the American view. The War Department as well as the Department of State took the position that, unsatisfactory though it might
be to send American soldiers into Mexico in civilian clothes and without arms, to arrive at an impasse with Mexico and risk having permission to
install the radar sets refused would be even more undesirable. Accordingly, on 20 December General DeWitt was authorized to accede to Mexican wishes
in the matter. His efforts to obtain a less dangerous and more face-saving solution
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continued but met with slight success.82 After the summer of 1942 this particular issue ceased to be a matter of record. The establishment of the
radar stations, a diminution of American activity in Baja California, and the withdrawal of American personnel were probably responsible.
Two of the radar stations were set up and began operations during the first week in June 1942 and the third a month later. At each, one officer and
twenty-five enlisted men were stationed to operate the set and train Mexican military personnel in its use. The equipment itself was turned over to
the Mexican Army under lend-lease. By the end of August the Mexican troops had taken over the operation of the sets, and the Americans had withdrawn
except for a small detachment of five men and one officer at each station.83 The coverage provided by the three sets was far from complete, but even
as early as October 1942 the War Department was breathing more easily and saw no need to install additional equipment. 84 By the summer of 1943
retrenchment had become the order of the day in Baja California. All Americans were withdrawn from the radar stations except for one officer and three
enlisted men, who were left in Ensenada primarily for liaison purposes. All requests for additional equipment had to be refused. By mid-May 1944 the
Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, reported that he no longer considered the three radar stations necessary for the defense of California and, much
to the dismay of both Navies, who wished to have the sets in operation for air-sea rescue work, operations ceased about the first of June. When, at a
meeting of the defense commission, Admiral Johnson protested against a Mexican Army proposal to move the equipment to Mexico City, General Henry was
obliged to state that the War Department's policy of retrenchment remained unchanged but that there would be no objection to the Navy's supplying and
maintaining the operation of the sets. For the remainder of the war, the Army had no further responsibility in the matter. One station resumed
operation with gasoline and oil supplied by the Navy. The
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other two were moved away.85 During the two years they had been in operation, the stations performed a useful function. They had closed all but a
small gap in the network around the San Diego-Los Angeles area. Anticipated language difficulties failed to materialize to any great extent, and
valuable training in the use of highly technical equipment was given our Mexican ally.
As part of the general scheme of filling in the gaps in the defenses of California after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Air Force had strongly
urged the building of three landing fields for pursuit planes in Baja California and two staging fields, one near Rosario and the other near La Paz.
Time, and authority to use the fields for operations, were the important considerations. Both the War Department and the joint defense commission,
when formally constituted, were agreed upon the desirability of the proposal, which the commission adopted as its Fourth Recommendation on 10 April
1942.86 After some backing and filling a joint survey got well under way and recommended three sites as primary airdromes-El Cipres, six miles south
of Ensenada; Camalu, just south of San Jacinto; and Trinidad, about eighteen miles south of La Ventura. 87 Later, four other fields were surveyed. For
three weeks at the end of June and in early July the War Department, on the advice of the joint defense commission, called a halt to all activity in
connection with the airfields in order to give Mexican opinion time to crystallize and to give General Card##as an opportunity to make a decision.
After authority was given to proceed with the plans and estimates for the original five airfields, General Card##as and especially General Juan Felipe
Rico, the local Mexican commander, took hold of the project with enthusiasm and pushed not only the airfields but also a connecting highway down the
peninsula. General DeWitt promised any help in materials and equipment that General Rico might need. The United States, General DeWitt thought, was
committed to assist both projects, the roads as well as the airfields.88
By the beginning of 1943, the War Department had begun to cool, although the Fourth Air Force still urged that the three northern fields, at El
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Cipres, Camalu, and Trinidad, be constructed and tied to San Diego by connecting roads. In March the War Department rejected General Rico's request
for materials and equipment for the construction of the airfields. The Mexican section of the joint commission thus found itself in the position, in
August, of arguing in favor of the United States Army undertaking a defense construction project on Mexican soil, while the American section was
opposed. With the War Department unwilling to provide the construction materials because of the urgent needs of more active theaters of operations,
the discussion became academic.89
In the field of joint planning, the Mexican experience took a contrary course to that of Canadian-United States planning. In the case of the latter a
basic plan was drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board, and local joint plans, more detailed and specific, were subsequently completed in accordance
with its general principles. With Mexico, on the other hand, the only joint plan completed during the war was the DeWitt-Card##as plan of
February-March 1942 for the defense of the Pacific coastal region. When later the joint defense commission undertook to draw up a plan, two of the
members-Admiral Johnson and General Castillo Najera-understood that the commission was supposed to base its plan on the DeWitt-Card##as agreements. A
casual observer would perhaps have seen little in the local situation to indicate much success for the Western Defense Command planners. The local
Mexican commanders either were uncertain of their authority to commit the federal government or were reluctant to accept instructions from Mexico
City; the difficulties and delays in obtaining full permission for a reconnaissance in Baja California were inauspicious. But such an observer would
have been wrong. Actually, the Mexican commanders made clear their willingness and desire to cooperate, and if they were reluctant to place their
names to a document committing them to joint action, they made it plain by word of mouth that in an emergency they would call on General DeWitt to
send American troops into Mexico.
In its final shape the plan represented a compromise between an earlier draft drawn up by General DeWitt's headquarters and one presented by General
Card##as.90 It provided for the patrol and defense of the two coastal areas-Mexican and American-by the forces of the respective countries, for an
exchange of information between the two forces, and for the passage of troops of either country through the territory of the other; and it permitted
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the forces of either country to operate in the other, in uniform and under arms. There were several provisions that failed to meet with the approval
of General Card##as. The Mexican commander could not agree to the control and operation of airfields and radar stations in Mexico by American
personnel, and insisted that the forces of one country operating in the territory of the other be under the commander in whose area they were
operating.91 Both generals agreed that the plan was sound from a "military standpoint" and that "the question from a nationalistic standpoint is one
for the decision of the two governments." 92 The points on which the two commanders could not agree were accordingly turned over to the joint defense
commission.
The American section thought it best to defer consideration of a general, basic plan until such specific matters as the radar stations and airfields
were agreed upon, and when the draft of a basic plan was presented by Col. Lemuel Mathewson at the meeting of 21 April 1942, it was patterned after
the Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan of 1940.93 Little progress had been made when Admiral Johnson, becoming chairman of the American section,
suggested a fresh start and a new approach. This was in December 1942. The new scheme-to draw up a plan of collaboration, in ratification of the
agreements reached by the commission, instead of a defense plan-was no more easily agreed upon than the old. General Henry, recently appointed senior
Army member, took over the job of drafting a new plan in collaboration with General Alamillo of the Mexican section. Discussion during the meetings
the following summer and fall reveal what seem to be a measure of impatience and perhaps satiation. The question of command proved to be the stumbling
block, and by April 1944 General Henry was ready to abandon the attempt to write an acceptable plan. Finally, after more than two years of effort, the
commission decided upon a "statement of general principles . . . which might serve as a basis for other plans of collaboration between any two
nations." 94
In a broader sense, the wartime collaboration between the United States and Mexico cannot be measured adequately by the activity in Baja California,
by the joint planning of General DeWitt and General Card##as, by the deliberations of the defense commission, or by the airfields provided from
Tampico to Tapachula. All of these might well have created dissension. But
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from the early wartime experience came a closer bond between the two countries. The commendable combat record of the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron on
Luzon, the Mexican airmen who gave their lives in the same cause for which American fliers died, these were the true measure of the cooperation that
began in 1941. There were indications that ties so strongly forged would not be lightly dropped. Although the joint defense commission had not been
formally designated as a permanent body, plans were made at a staff conference in March 1945, at which the American members of the commission
represented the United States, to continue the defense commission in the postwar years. The mutual confidence and respect between the two countries
that developed out of their wartime association are proof that the New World can still serve as a beacon for the Old.
====================================================
Ken Cooke and a Pole, 2004:
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durrelllrobert
Elite Nomad
Posts: 7393
Registered: 11-22-2007
Location: Punta Banda BC
Member Is Offline
Mood: thriving in Baja
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How many BajaNomads knew this?
"The commendable combat record of the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron on Luzon, the Mexican airmen who gave their lives in the same cause for which
American fliers died, these were the true measure of the cooperation that began in 1941. "
I certainly didn't know that the Mexican Airforce participated in WWII as an ally to the US.
Bob Durrell
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