[Some fresh interest in the Pole Line Road and the activities of the U.S. in Baja Mexico in 1941-1942 seems to a good time to post these articles
again.]
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Since traveling on the WWII Pole Line Road northwest of San Felipe and seeing the American telephone poles, insulators, road building, and rusty cans
from 1942, I have been searching for some mention of this (beyond the Lower California Guidebook's reference). I found the following articles about
the war period in San Diego... of interest it also deals with the water shortage, dams, and this:
While United States Cavalry patrolled the border and guarded nearby reservoirs, concern arose over the possibility of enemy use of airfields or bays
of Baja California. Though Mexico had not declared war on Japan, the two naval bases and five airfields of Baja California were placed at the service
of the United States, and a former president, General Lazaro C a r d e n a s, was recalled from retirement to command the Pacific Zone. Troops in Baja
California were reinforced, two battalions of 1,500 soldiers moving from Sonora through San Diego, by train, to Tijuana.
Early in January Presidents Roosevelt and Manuel Avila Camacho of Mexico had set up a United States-Mexico Defense Board and soon afterward Mexican
aircraft began daily patrols from Cedros Island northward and Mexican gunboats aided in protecting minefields along the coast. Japanese farmers were
moved inland from the coastal area.
After a conference in San Diego, on cooperation in defense, attended by General C a r d e n a s, controls were placed on fishing activities in the
Gulf of California and the Pacific Coast north of Mazatlan. Soldiers and volunteer militia were assigned to construct telephone and telegraph lines
and roads in the peninsula.
Mexico's caution about entering the war vanished when two government-owned oil tankers were torpedoed in the Gulf of Mexico. On June 1, Mexico would
join the United States in war against Germany, Italy and Japan.
The entire article is online: CHAPTER 1: War - and the Shape of Things to Come | San Diego History Center
From: California in World War II: San Diego Metropolitan Area during World War II
Arrangements were made between the U.S. Government and the Government of Mexico to allow joint teams of U.S. Army officers and Mexicans Army officers
and soldiers to patrol the Mexican peninsula of Baja California. The teams were platoon-size units and patrolled all the way to the southern tip of
the peninsula. There were persistent rumors early in the war that the Japanese might have secret air bases in Baja California, but no evidence of this
was ever found. The American officers were required to wear civilian clothing and all U.S. markings had to be removed from U.S. Army vehicles and
other equipment to accommodate Mexico's neutrality laws.
As far as the southern reaches of the radar network was concerned, and unknown by most people still, there were at least three radar sites built and
commanded by the U.S. Army in Mexico along the coast of Baja California to protect the southern approaches to San Diego. According to Mexican Forts
known sites included Station B-92 at Punta Salispuedes, located 22 miles northwest of Ensenada (later moved to Alasitos, 36 miles south of Tiajuana);
Station B-94 at Punta San Jacinto, 60 miles south of Ensenada; and Station B-97 at Punta Estrella, south of San Felipe on the Gulf of California (aka
Sea of Cortez).
[It is not clear when all three of the radar sites were in full operation, but it is known through outside observers that the Punta Estrella site was
operational and fully staffed by April of 1942.]
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Here is a detailed post I found on the Internet back in 2009:
Mexico and the Defense of California
American concern for the security of Mexico was intimately related to the extent and proximity of any threat to United States territory. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the security of Baja California became a matter of acute interest to the United States. Just as lend-lease was a manifestation
of American interest in the security of Mexico, so the measures taken by General DeWitt and General Card##as, singly and jointly for the defense of
the United States' southwest and Mexico's northwest were concrete expressions of Mexican cooperation in the defense of the United States.
There were three fields of activity in which the defense of California involved joint action with Mexico: first, the placing of aircraft detector
stations in Baja California; second, the building of airfields and highways there; and third, the formulation of joint plans by General DeWitt and
General Card##as.
The proposal to establish radar stations in Baja California grew out of a study made by the GHQ Air Force early in 1941, disclosing that vital areas
in the southwest, near the Mexican boundary, could not be adequately covered either by a ground observation system or by radar detectors in American
territory. "An enemy desiring to attack Southern California," a later Air Forces report stated, "may be expected to be aware of the limitations of our
Aircraft Warning Service, and will make his approach over or from Mexican territory. "The Air Forces therefore recommended taking steps to obtain
Mexico's permission to establish at least two detector stations in Baja California. These views were brought to the attention of the War Plans
Division sometime in April. Without denying the merits of the proposal, the War Plans Division informed the Army Air Forces that the moment was not
propitious for discussing the subject with the Mexican staff representatives, then in Washington. The Air Forces continued to agitate the matter
during the next three months, only to receive the same reply: "The War Department considers it inadvisable to submit to the Mexican representatives a
request to station detachments of U.S. Army armed and uniformed forces in Mexican territory, as it is convinced that the Mexican Government would
reject such a request at this time." In framing the War Plans Division reply, Colonel Ridgway, then serving as one of the American staff
representatives, noted, "there is no probability of securing Mexican consent . . . at least until an Axis attack is delivered or imminent."
No action was taken until 3 December 1941, four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the American staff representatives presented their
Mexican colleagues with a proposal for an immediate reconnaissance of Sonora and Baja California for the purpose of locating sites for radar stations.
Although it was agreed that the necessity of using the installations might never arise, the American representatives nevertheless proposed that the
preliminary steps be taken at once and that small mixed groups of United States officers and Mexicans, in civilian clothes, should survey the area
within two hundred miles of the border for access roads and radar sites. An appeal on 8 December brought a reply from President Avila Camacho the same
day giving full permission to make the reconnaissance and install the radar stations. To the original purpose the Air Staff had, however, added that
of investigating rumors of Japanese airfields and fuel caches. A separate party under Maj. A. P. Ebright conducted the Air Staff survey, entering
Mexico on 16 December. An attempt by the War Department to identify the Ebright mission with the radar station reconnaissance no doubt contributed to
the initial confusion and suspicion that attended it. Although no signs of enemy activity were uncovered, the Ebright party remained in Mexico until
the end of January to investigate suitable sites for landing fields, to report on the availability of water and other supplies along the route of
communications from the border south, and in general to add to the Army's store of information about the area. As the immediate post-Pearl Harbor
frenzy subsided and as the scope and positions of the Ebright mission became clarified, General DeWitt's Western Defense Command headquarters gave it
firmer support against the continued skepticism at the headquarters of the Southern California Sector. Meanwhile, other groups had crossed the border,
and had tentatively chosen sites for radar detector stations at Punta Salispuedes, 20 miles northwest of Ensenada; Punta San Jacinto, 125 miles south
of Ensenada; and Punta Diggs on the northeast coast of the peninsula.
With all this activity going on, the issue that had threatened the negotiations over staging fields the previous summer-whether Mexico would permit
the entry and stationing of armed and uniformed American soldiers promised to become a hardy perennial. On the earlier occasion, it had been solved by
accepting the Mexican position, and when the proposal for the reconnaissance of Baja California was presented to the staff representatives on 3
December the wearing of civilian clothes by the soldiers making the survey was accepted by the American representatives as inescapable. The first
draft of the instructions for `the reconnaissance, drawn up on 9 December for the Chief of the Army Air Forces, stated, "United States personnel will
be limited to officers and they will wear civilian clothing," but at the suggestion of G-2, and with the concurrence of Colonel Ridgway, this
particular restriction was deleted.81 Because of the United States' belligerent status, it was no longer appropriate. General DeWitt was especially
insistent that no soldiers cross into Mexico unless in uniform and armed, but the point was not raised with Mexican representatives in Washington.
Consequently, the Ebright group was turned back at the border and not permitted to cross until the men changed into civilian clothing and left their
weapons behind. Sometimes, depending on the attitude of the local Mexican commanders, American parties were permitted to enter the country in uniform,
but never under arms, and not even the excellent personal relations that existed between General DeWitt and General Card##as could bring about a
definite acceptance of the American view. The War Department as well as the Department of State took the position that, unsatisfactory though it might
be to send American soldiers into Mexico in civilian clothes and without arms, to arrive at an impasse with Mexico and risk having permission to
install the radar sets refused would be even more undesirable. Accordingly, on 20 December General DeWitt was authorized to accede to Mexican wishes
in the matter. His efforts to obtain a less dangerous and more face-saving solution continued but met with slight success. After the summer of 1942
this particular issue ceased to be a matter of record. The establishment of the radar stations, a diminution of American activity in Baja California,
and the withdrawal of American personnel were probably responsible.
Two of the radar stations were set up and began operations during the first week in June 1942 and the third a month later. At each, one officer and
twenty-five enlisted men were stationed to operate the set and train Mexican military personnel in its use. The equipment itself was turned over to
the Mexican Army under lend-lease. By the end of August the Mexican troops had taken over the operation of the sets, and the Americans had withdrawn
except for a small detachment of five men and one officer at each station.83 The coverage provided by the three sets was far from complete, but even
as early as October 1942 the War Department was breathing more easily and saw no need to install additional equipment. 84 By the summer of 1943
retrenchment had become the order of the day in Baja California. All Americans were withdrawn from the radar stations except for one officer and three
enlisted men, who were left in Ensenada primarily for liaison purposes. All requests for additional equipment had to be refused. By mid-May 1944 the
Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, reported that he no longer considered the three radar stations necessary for the defense of California and, much
to the dismay of both Navies, who wished to have the sets in operation for air-sea rescue work, operations ceased about the first of June. When, at a
meeting of the defense commission, Admiral Johnson protested against a Mexican Army proposal to move the equipment to Mexico City, General Henry was
obliged to state that the War Department's policy of retrenchment remained unchanged but that there would be no objection to the Navy's supplying and
maintaining the operation of the sets. For the remainder of the war, the Army had no further responsibility in the matter. One station resumed
operation with gasoline and oil supplied by the Navy. The other two were moved away.85 During the two years they had been in operation, the stations
performed a useful function. They had closed all but a small gap in the network around the San Diego-Los Angeles area. Anticipated language
difficulties failed to materialize to any great extent, and valuable training in the use of highly technical equipment was given our Mexican ally.
As part of the general scheme of filling in the gaps in the defenses of California after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Air Force had strongly
urged the building of three landing fields for pursuit planes in Baja California and two staging fields, one near Rosario and the other near La Paz.
Time, and authority to use the fields for operations, were the important considerations. Both the War Department and the joint defense commission,
when formally constituted, were agreed upon the desirability of the proposal, which the commission adopted as its Fourth Recommendation on 10 April
1942.86 After some backing and filling a joint survey got well under way and recommended three sites as primary airdromes-El Cipres, six miles south
of Ensenada; Camalu, just south of San Jacinto; and Trinidad, about eighteen miles south of La Ventura. Later, four other fields were surveyed. For
three weeks at the end of June and in early July the War Department, on the advice of the joint defense commission, called a halt to all activity in
connection with the airfields in order to give Mexican opinion time to crystallize and to give General Card##as an opportunity to make a decision.
After authority was given to proceed with the plans and estimates for the original five airfields, General Card##as and especially General Juan Felipe
Rico, the local Mexican commander, took hold of the project with enthusiasm and pushed not only the airfields but also a connecting highway down the
peninsula. General DeWitt promised any help in materials and equipment that General Rico might need. The United States, General DeWitt thought, was
committed to assist both projects, the roads as well as the airfields.88
By the beginning of 1943, the War Department had begun to cool, although the Fourth Air Force still urged that the three northern fields, at El
Cipres, Camalu, and Trinidad, be constructed and tied to San Diego by connecting roads. In March the War Department rejected General Rico's request
for materials and equipment for the construction of the airfields. The Mexican section of the joint commission thus found itself in the position, in
August, of arguing in favor of the United States Army undertaking a defense construction project on Mexican soil, while the American section was
opposed. With the War Department unwilling to provide the construction materials because of the urgent needs of more active theaters of operations,
the discussion became academic.
In the field of joint planning, the Mexican experience took a contrary course to that of Canadian-United States planning. In the case of the latter a
basic plan was drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board, and local joint plans, more detailed and specific, were subsequently completed in accordance
with its general principles. With Mexico, on the other hand, the only joint plan completed during the war was the DeWitt-Card##as plan of
February-March 1942 for the defense of the Pacific coastal region. When later the joint defense commission undertook to draw up a plan, two of the
members-Admiral Johnson and General Castillo Najera-understood that the commission was supposed to base its plan on the DeWitt-Card##as agreements. A
casual observer would perhaps have seen little in the local situation to indicate much success for the Western Defense Command planners. The local
Mexican commanders either were uncertain of their authority to commit the federal government or were reluctant to accept instructions from Mexico
City; the difficulties and delays in obtaining full permission for a reconnaissance in Baja California were inauspicious. But such an observer would
have been wrong. Actually, the Mexican commanders made clear their willingness and desire to cooperate, and if they were reluctant to place their
names to a document committing them to joint action, they made it plain by word of mouth that in an emergency they would call on General DeWitt to
send American troops into Mexico.
In its final shape the plan represented a compromise between an earlier draft drawn up by General DeWitt's headquarters and one presented by General
Card##as. It provided for the patrol and defense of the two coastal areas-Mexican and American-by the forces of the respective countries, for an
exchange of information between the two forces, and for the passage of troops of either country through the territory of the other; and it permitted
the forces of either country to operate in the other, in uniform and under arms. There were several provisions that failed to meet with the approval
of General Card##as. The Mexican commander could not agree to the control and operation of airfields and radar stations in Mexico by American
personnel, and insisted that the forces of one country operating in the territory of the other be under the commander in whose area they were
operating. Both generals agreed that the plan was sound from a "military standpoint" and that "the question from a nationalistic standpoint is one for
the decision of the two governments." The points on which the two commanders could not agree were accordingly turned over to the joint defense
commission.
The American section thought it best to defer consideration of a general, basic plan until such specific matters as the radar stations and airfields
were agreed upon, and when the draft of a basic plan was presented by Col. Lemuel Mathewson at the meeting of 21 April 1942, it was patterned after
the Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan of 1940. Little progress had been made when Admiral Johnson, becoming chairman of the American section,
suggested a fresh start and a new approach. This was in December 1942. The new scheme-to draw up a plan of collaboration, in ratification of the
agreements reached by the commission, instead of a defense plan-was no more easily agreed upon than the old. General Henry, recently appointed senior
Army member, took over the job of drafting a new plan in collaboration with General Alamillo of the Mexican section. Discussion during the meetings
the following summer and fall reveal what seem to be a measure of impatience and perhaps satiation. The question of command proved to be the stumbling
block, and by April 1944 General Henry was ready to abandon the attempt to write an acceptable plan. Finally, after more than two years of effort, the
commission decided upon a "statement of general principles . . . which might serve as a basis for other plans of collaboration between any two
nations."
In a broader sense, the wartime collaboration between the United States and Mexico cannot be measured adequately by the activity in Baja California,
by the joint planning of General DeWitt and General Card##as, by the deliberations of the defense commission, or by the airfields provided from
Tampico to Tapachula. All of these might well have created dissension. But
from the early wartime experience came a closer bond between the two countries. The commendable combat record of the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron on
Luzon, the Mexican airmen who gave their lives in the same cause for which American fliers died, these were the true measure of the cooperation that
began in 1941. There were indications that ties so strongly forged would not be lightly dropped. Although the joint defense commission had not been
formally designated as a permanent body, plans were made at a staff conference in March 1945, at which the American members of the commission
represented the United States, to continue the defense commission in the postwar years. The mutual confidence and respect between the two countries
that developed out of their wartime association are proof that the New World can still serve as a beacon for the Old.
American WWII Air Defense Radar Stations
(1942 - 1943), State of Baja California (Norte)
During the early years of WWII the U.S. Army built and manned at least three SCR-270 early warning anti-aircraft radar stations along the coast of
Baja California Norte, operated by the 654th AWS Company, to protect the southern approaches to San Diego, California. Known sites include Station
B-92 at Punta Salispuedes, located 22 miles northwest of Ensenada (later moved to Alasitos, 36 miles south of Tijuana); Station B-94 at Punta San
Jacinto, 60 miles south of Ensenada; and Station B-97 at Punta Estrella (Diggs), south of San Felipe on the Gulf of California (aka Sea of Cortez).
==============================================
This story talks about how the U.S. built the modern road from Mexicali to San Felipe in 1942, and why. The Pole Line Road was built to secure and
maintain the new telephone line the U.S. installed from the telephone line in Ensenada across to San Felipe to communicate with our radar station
there:
From Gene Kira's MexFish.com
"MILK RUN” (LITERALLY)
“The first trip I made to San Felipe in Mexico was to deliver dairy products to the Army radar station in the spring of 1942.
“Sometime, in about April I think, my dad pulled me out of the second grade, and we got into a 1938 Dodge truck and headed for San Felipe.
“The truck was filled with milk, butter, eggs, cheese and ice cream and we were headed for the army ‘base’ at San Felipe.
“Because of the war, there was a 35 m.p.h. speed limit, and we spent the night at Calexico, at the Anza Hotel, I think.
“We got up early the next morning. I don't remember having to stop going in either direction at the border. We crossed at Calexico and it was marked
as the border, but I don't think there was any official border activity.
“We were not far out of town, across the border, when we were stopped at the first of maybe four check points before we reached San Felipe. These
stops were manned by American soldiers, not Mexicans.
“My dad explained that we were going to a military installation in San Felipe that had just been built, and what it did was listen for airplanes
using something called ‘radar.’ In the last six months, the Army had built a paved road to San Felipe called the ‘radar road’ which made the
drive south a lot easier than it had been, unlike the month-long ordeal of mud and flood up until 1942.
“What we drive on today is the ‘radar road,’ although it has been paved a couple of times since then.
“I may be the only person to remember driving on that stretch of road during World War II who is still alive today. I can remember, the water was
right up to the road's edge in places, and my dad said that if it were not for the road, we'd have to wait for the tides to change and for the mud to
dry out.
“The ‘base’ was near where the old icehouse was until recently, and we were stopped from driving into the main area. About 20 young soldiers
came out to the barbed-wire fence and had the truck unloaded in a very short time, and we turned right around and headed home.”
The Mexican-American Defense Commission meetings continued and now focused on the primary objective of Mexico’s role in the protection of North
America, [Mexico had not declared war] the future protection of Mexico itself, and the third primary concern became the defense of the sparsely
populated Baja California region from Japanese submarines and possible invasion. The Mexican government was now anxious to have any American airpower
including even occupation of American troops on the Baja California narrow peninsula. Then, Mexico declared war on the Axis Powers on 28 May 1942,
after German submarine attacks were made on her shipping in the Gulf of Mexico. The United States at once began to construct roads into the remote
Baja area, built a 150-mile-long telephone line for communication to the remote site at San Felipe base, and by November 1942, three American radar
stations were operating with one on the Gulf of California side [Punta Diggs – Punta Estrella] and two on the Pacific Ocean side. The beginning of
1943, possibly marked the end of Japanese submarines using the Mexican coastline and Magdalena Bay for hiding and refueling sites.4x4abc - 4-2-2019 at 12:34 PM
one of the airfields not mentioned is on Isla Guadalupe
it had 2 WWII plane wrecks - one on each end of the runway
one is gone now, one still remainsStuckSucks - 4-2-2019 at 01:00 PM
My info is that Cielito Lindo was found by military scouts flying the coast during WWII.
John Ford the movie producer and his military movie people adopted it as their hangout after the war.
Probably happened in other spots as well.David K - 6-11-2019 at 11:38 AM
My info is that Cielito Lindo was found by military scouts flying the coast during WWII.
John Ford the movie producer and his military movie people adopted it as their hangout after the war.
Probably happened in other spots as well.
Sounds great. No doubt that after the war, having seen such wonderful coastlines during the airfield construction at El Rosario and other spots for
the defense project! Plus, thanks to the war effort, we now had Jeeps and Power Wagons to travel easily down the peninsula!
Howard Gulick began researching Baja in his Willys wagon in the late 1940s. Marquis McDonald and his WWII buddy traveled in a CJ-2 or MB all over Baja
in 1949 to later write his Lost Missions book.Howard - 6-11-2019 at 02:28 PM
If memory serves me correct (Normally it doesn't) isn't there a post war picture of John Wayne bird hunting hanging in Cielito Lindo's dining room?David K - 6-11-2019 at 02:42 PM
Just thumbing through my old AAA guides, and Cielito Lindo was first mentioned, and added to their map, in 1973. The Old Mill Motel (Ernesto's) was
north and the closed Santa María Sky Ranch was just south. I drove in to have a look in 1974 at it and the new El Presidente Hotel, 'next door' (now
the Hotel Misión Santa María).bajaguy - 6-12-2019 at 07:01 AM
[Edited on 6-12-2019 by bajaguy]fishbuck - 6-12-2019 at 02:17 PM
I gotta think that the name of his boat "The Wild Goose" has to come from the Black Brant geese in San Quintin bay. He spent alot of time there.
All the hollywood types around John Wayne and John Ford hung out there until the highway came and then they moved on. I bet the runway was very active
back then.David K - 6-12-2019 at 06:15 PM
As I said, there was no Cielito Lindo before 1973 (per the Auto Club's annual new guides... However, the Santa María Sky Ranch was pretty active in
the 1960s. Erle Stanley Gardner and his guests used the Sky Ranch as a stop when the WX has too bad for flying VFR.
In 1973, Arnold Senterfitt changed the airstrip name from Rancho de la Mañana (no motel) to Cielito Lindo... and in his comments says that the dream
of a hotel at this spot has finally come true. In his 1969 edition, he said "one day" and active resort will come here.
Guadalupe Island plane wrecks
Marla Daily - 6-14-2019 at 07:13 PM
WIKIPEDIA: Campo Pista is located at the small airport, near the center of the island (29°01′24.04″N 118°16′21.75″W, elevation:592 m,
direction:05/23).[1] Airport Isla Guadalupe (ICAO Code MMGD) has a 1,200-metre-long (3,900 ft) runway. At the end of the runway near threshold 5 is
the wreckage of a Lockheed Model 18 Lodestar, which overshot the runway during landing. A North American B-25J-30/32 Mitchell, BMM-3501 (c/n
44-86712), bomber wrecked on the opposite end of the runway, after suffering serious damage in trying to take-off overloaded (29°01′36.10″N
118°16′2.98″W). Based on historical Google Earth imagery, this B-25 wreckage appears to have been removed from the location between October 2005
and June 2006.
