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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64852
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Will pack up the Tacoma tonight... but have all my gear set out so it is ready... traveling real light, so no hot tub or dance floor (although Ken
Cooke is a DJ)!
Leaving San Marcos close to 5:30 tomorrow morning so I hope to be in Calexico easily by 8.
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bajatrailrider
Super Nomad
Posts: 2432
Registered: 1-24-2015
Location: Mexico
Member Is Offline
Mood: Happy
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I think Im ready,as no more room to load more junk.Even removed rear seat.
 
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64852
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Do I see a ladder? You joining us for the hike Monday?
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64852
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Why the Pole Line Road was built...
This story talks about how the U.S. built the modern road from Mexicali to San Felipe in 1942, and why. The Pole Line Road was built to secure and
maintain the new telephone line the U.S. installed from the telephone line in Ensenada across to San Felipe to communicate with our radar station
there:
From Gene Kira's MexFish.com
MILK RUN” (LITERALLY)
“The first trip I made to San Felipe in Mexico was to deliver dairy products to the Army radar station in the spring of 1942.
“Sometime, in about April I think, my dad pulled me out of the second grade, and we got into a 1938 Dodge truck and headed for San Felipe.
“The truck was filled with milk, butter, eggs, cheese and ice cream and we were headed for the army ‘base’ at San Felipe.
“Because of the war, there was a 35 m.p.h. speed limit, and we spent the night at Calexico, at the Anza Hotel, I think.
“We got up early the next morning. I don't remember having to stop going in either direction at the border. We crossed at Calexico and it was marked
as the border, but I don't think there was any official border activity.
“We were not far out of town, across the border, when we were stopped at the first of maybe four check points before we reached San Felipe. These
stops were manned by American soldiers, not Mexicans.
“My dad explained that we were going to a military installation in San Felipe that had just been built, and what it did was listen for airplanes using
something called ‘radar.’ In the last six months, the Army had built a paved road to San Felipe called the ‘radar road’ which made the drive south a
lot easier than it had been, unlike the month-long ordeal of mud and flood up until 1942.
“What we drive on today is the ‘radar road,’ although it has been paved a couple of times since then.
“I may be the only person to remember driving on that stretch of road during World War II who is still alive today. I can remember, the water was
right up to the road's edge in places, and my dad said that if it were not for the road, we'd have to wait for the tides to change and for the mud to
dry out.
“The ‘base’ was near where the old icehouse was until recently, and we were stopped from driving into the main area. About 20 young soldiers came out
to the barbed-wire fence and had the truck unloaded in a very short time, and we turned right around and headed home.”
=======================================================
http://www.northamericanforts.com/Latin/mexico.html#radar
American WWII Air Defense Radar Stations
(1942 - 1943), State of Baja California (Norte)
During the early years of WWII the U.S. Army built and manned at least three SCR-270 early warning anti-aircraft radar stations along the coast of
Baja California Norte, operated by the 654th AWS Company, to protect the southern approaches to San Diego, California. Known sites include Station
B-92 at Punta Salispuedes, located 22 miles northwest of Ensenada (later moved to Alasitos, 36 miles south of Tijuana); Station B-94 at Punta San
Jacinto, 60 miles south of Ensenada; and Station B-97 at Punta Estrella (Diggs), south of San Felipe on the Gulf of California (aka Sea of Cortez).
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64852
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Mexico and the Defense of California in WWII
From: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WH-Frame/USA-WH-Fram...
Mexico and the Defense of California
American concern for the security of Mexico was intimately related to the extent and proximity of any threat to United States territory. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the security of Baja California became a matter of acute interest to the United States. Just as lend-lease was a manifestation
of American interest in the security of Mexico, so the measures taken by General DeWitt and General Card##as, singly and jointly for the defense of
the United States' southwest and Mexico's northwest were concrete expressions of Mexican cooperation in the defense of the United States.
There were three fields of activity in which the defense of California involved joint action with Mexico: first, the placing of aircraft detector
stations in Baja California; second, the building of airfields and highways there; and third, the formulation of joint plans by General DeWitt and
General Card##as.
The proposal to establish radar stations in Baja California grew out of a study made by the GHQ Air Force early in 1941, disclosing that vital areas
in the southwest, near the Mexican boundary, could not be adequately covered either by a ground observation system or by radar detectors in American
territory. "An enemy desiring to attack Southern California," a later Air Forces report stated, "may be expected to be aware of the limitations of our
Aircraft Warning Service, and will make his approach over or from Mexican territory. " The Air Forces therefore recommended taking steps to obtain
Mexico's permission to establish at least two detector stations in Baja California.
These views were brought to the attention of the War Plans Division sometime in April. Without denying the merits of the proposal, the War Plans
Division informed the Army Air Forces that the moment was not propitious for discussing the subject with the Mexican staff representatives, then in
Washington. The Air Forces continued to agitate the matter during the next three months, only to receive the same reply: "The War Department considers
it inadvisable to submit to the Mexican representatives a request to station detachments of U.S. Army armed and uniformed forces in Mexican territory,
as it is convinced that the Mexican Government would reject such a request at this time. In framing the War Plans Division reply, Colonel Ridgway,
then serving as one of the American staff representatives, noted, "there is no probability of securing Mexican consent . . . at least until an Axis
attack is delivered or imminent."
No action was taken until 3 December 1941, four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the American staff representatives presented their
Mexican colleagues with a proposal for an immediate reconnaissance of Sonora and Baja California for the purpose of locating sites for radar stations.
Although it was agreed that the necessity of using the installations might never arise, the American representatives nevertheless proposed that the
preliminary steps be taken at once and that small mixed groups of United States officers and Mexicans, in civilian clothes, should survey the area
within two hundred miles of the border for access roads and radar sites. An appeal on 8 December brought a reply from President Avila Camacho the same
day giving full permission to make the reconnaissance and install the radar stations. To the original purpose the Air Staff had, however, added that
of investigating rumors of Japanese airfields and fuel caches. A separate party under Maj. A. P. Ebright conducted the Air Staff survey, entering
Mexico on 16 December. An attempt by the War Department to identify the Ebright mission with the radar station reconnaissance no doubt contributed to
the initial confusion and suspicion that attended it.
Although no signs of enemy activity were uncovered, the Ebright party remained in Mexico until the end of January to investigate suitable sites for
landing fields, to report on the availability of water and other supplies along the route of communications from the border south, and in general to
add to the Army's store of information about the area.
As the immediate post-Pearl Harbor frenzy subsided and as the scope and positions of the Ebright mission became clarified, General DeWitt's Western
Defense Command headquarters gave it firmer support against the continued skepticism at the headquarters of the Southern California Sector. Meanwhile,
other groups had crossed the border, and had tentatively chosen sites for radar detector stations at Punta Salispuedes, 20 miles northwest of
Ensenada; Punta San Jacinto, 125 miles south of Ensenada; and Punta Diggs on the northeast coast of the peninsula.
With all this activity going on, the issue that had threatened the negotiations over staging fields the previous summer-whether Mexico would permit
the entry and stationing of armed and uniformed American soldiers promised to become a hardy perennial. On the earlier occasion, it had been solved by
accepting the Mexican position, and when the proposal for the reconnaissance of Baja California was presented to the staff representatives on 3
December the wearing of civilian clothes by the soldiers making the survey was accepted by the American representatives as inescapable. The first
draft of the instructions for "the reconnaissance, drawn up on 9 December for the Chief of the Army Air Forces, stated, "United States personnel will
be limited to officers and they will wear civilian clothing," but at the suggestion of G-2, and with the concurrence of Colonel Ridgway, this
particular restriction was deleted.
Because of the United States' belligerent status, it was no longer appropriate. General DeWitt was especially insistent that no soldiers cross into
Mexico unless in uniform and armed, but the point was not raised with Mexican representatives in Washington. Consequently, the Ebright group was
turned back at the border and not permitted to cross until the men changed into civilian clothing and left their weapons behind. Sometimes, depending
on the attitude of the local Mexican commanders, American parties were permitted to enter the country in uniform, but never under arms, and not even
the excellent personal relations that existed between General DeWitt and General Card##as could bring about a definite acceptance of the American
view. The War Department as well as the Department of State took the position that, unsatisfactory though it might be to send American soldiers into
Mexico in civilian clothes and without arms, to arrive at an impasse with Mexico and risk having permission to install the radar sets refused would be
even more undesirable. Accordingly, on 20 December General DeWitt was authorized to accede to Mexican wishes in the matter. His efforts to obtain a
less dangerous and more face-saving solution continued but met with slight success. After the summer of 1942 this particular issue ceased to be a
matter of record. The establishment of the radar stations, a diminution of American activity in Baja California, and the withdrawal of American
personnel were probably responsible.
Two of the radar stations were set up and began operations during the first week in June 1942 and the third a month later. At each, one officer and
twenty-five enlisted men were stationed to operate the set and train Mexican military personnel in its use. The equipment itself was turned over to
the Mexican Army under lend-lease. By the end of August the Mexican troops had taken over the operation of the sets, and the Americans had withdrawn
except for a small detachment of five men and one officer at each station.
The coverage provided by the three sets was far from complete, but even as early as October 1942 the War Department was breathing more easily and saw
no need to install additional equipment.
By the summer of 1943 retrenchment had become the order of the day in Baja California. All Americans were withdrawn from the radar stations except for
one officer and three enlisted men, who were left in Ensenada primarily for liaison purposes. All requests for additional equipment had to be refused.
By mid-May 1944 the Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, reported that he no longer considered the three radar stations necessary for the defense of
California and, much to the dismay of both Navies, who wished to have the sets in operation for air-sea rescue work, operations ceased about the first
of June. When, at a meeting of the defense commission, Admiral Johnson protested against a Mexican Army proposal to move the equipment to Mexico City,
General Henry was obliged to state that the War Department's policy of retrenchment remained unchanged but that there would be no objection to the
Navy's supplying and maintaining the operation of the sets.
For the remainder of the war, the Army had no further responsibility in the matter. One station resumed operation with gasoline and oil supplied by
the Navy. The other two were moved away. During the two years they had been in operation, the stations performed a useful function. They had closed
all but a small gap in the network around the San Diego-Los Angeles area. Anticipated language difficulties failed to materialize to any great extent,
and valuable training in the use of highly technical equipment was given our Mexican ally.
As part of the general scheme of filling in the gaps in the defenses of California after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Air Force had strongly
urged the building of three landing fields for pursuit planes in Baja California and two staging fields, one near Rosario and the other near La Paz.
Time, and authority to use the fields for operations, were the important considerations.
Both the War Department and the joint defense commission, when formally constituted, were agreed upon the desirability of the proposal, which the
commission adopted as its Fourth Recommendation on 10 April 1942. After some backing and filling a joint survey got well under way and recommended
three sites as primary airdromes-El Cipres, six miles south of Ensenada; Camalu, just south of San Jacinto; and Trinidad, about eighteen miles south
of La Ventura. Later, four other fields were surveyed. For three weeks at the end of June and in early July the War Department, on the advice of the
joint defense commission, called a halt to all activity in connection with the airfields in order to give Mexican opinion time to crystallize and to
give General Card##as an opportunity to make a decision.
After authority was given to proceed with the plans and estimates for the original five airfields, General Card##as and especially General Juan Felipe
Rico, the local Mexican commander, took hold of the project with enthusiasm and pushed not only the airfields but also a connecting highway down the
peninsula. General DeWitt promised any help in materials and equipment that General Rico might need. The United States, General DeWitt thought, was
committed to assist both projects, the roads as well as the airfields.
By the beginning of 1943, the War Department had begun to cool, although the Fourth Air Force still urged that the three northern fields, at El
Cipres, Camalu, and Trinidad, be constructed and tied to San Diego by connecting roads. In March the War Department rejected General Rico's request
for materials and equipment for the construction of the airfields. The Mexican section of the joint commission thus found itself in the position, in
August, of arguing in favor of the United States Army undertaking a defense construction project on Mexican soil, while the American section was
opposed. With the War Department unwilling to provide the construction materials because of the urgent needs of more active theaters of operations,
the discussion became academic.
In the field of joint planning, the Mexican experience took a contrary course to that of Canadian-United States planning. In the case of the latter a
basic plan was drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board, and local joint plans, more detailed and specific, were subsequently completed in accordance
with its general principles. With Mexico, on the other hand, the only joint plan completed during the war was the DeWitt-Card##as plan of
February-March 1942 for the defense of the Pacific coastal region. When later the joint defense commission undertook to draw up a plan, two of the
members-Admiral Johnson and General Castillo Najera-understood that the commission was supposed to base its plan on the DeWitt-Card##as agreements. A
casual observer would perhaps have seen little in the local situation to indicate much success for the Western Defense Command planners. The local
Mexican commanders either were uncertain of their authority to commit the federal government or were reluctant to accept instructions from Mexico
City; the difficulties and delays in obtaining full permission for a reconnaissance in Baja California were inauspicious. But such an observer would
have been wrong. Actually, the Mexican commanders made clear their willingness and desire to cooperate, and if they were reluctant to place their
names to a document committing them to joint action, they made it plain by word of mouth that in an emergency they would call on General DeWitt to
send American troops into Mexico.
In its final shape the plan represented a compromise between an earlier draft drawn up by General DeWitt's headquarters and one presented by General
Card##as.90 It provided for the patrol and defense of the two coastal areas-Mexican and American-by the forces of the respective countries, for an
exchange of information between the two forces, and for the passage of troops of either country through the territory of the other; and it permitted
the forces of either country to operate in the other, in uniform and under arms. There were several provisions that failed to meet with the approval
of General Card##as. The Mexican commander could not agree to the control and operation of airfields and radar stations in Mexico by American
personnel, and insisted that the forces of one country operating in the territory of the other be under the commander in whose area they were
operating. Both generals agreed that the plan was sound from a "military standpoint" and that "the question from a nationalistic standpoint is one for
the decision of the two governments." The points on which the two commanders could not agree were accordingly turned over to the joint defense
commission.
The American section thought it best to defer consideration of a general, basic plan until such specific matters as the radar stations and airfields
were agreed upon, and when the draft of a basic plan was presented by Col. Lemuel Mathewson at the meeting of 21 April 1942, it was patterned after
the Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan of 1940.
Little progress had been made when Admiral Johnson, becoming chairman of the American section, suggested a fresh start and a new approach. This was in
December 1942. The new scheme-to draw up a plan of collaboration, in ratification of the agreements reached by the commission, instead of a defense
plan-was no more easily agreed upon than the old. General Henry, recently appointed senior Army member, took over the job of drafting a new plan in
collaboration with General Alamillo of the Mexican section.
Discussion during the meetings the following summer and fall reveal what seem to be a measure of impatience and perhaps satiation. The question of
command proved to be the stumbling block, and by April 1944 General Henry was ready to abandon the attempt to write an acceptable plan. Finally, after
more than two years of effort, the commission decided upon a "statement of general principles . . . which might serve as a basis for other plans of
collaboration between any two nations."
In a broader sense, the wartime collaboration between the United States and Mexico cannot be measured adequately by the activity in Baja California,
by the joint planning of General DeWitt and General Card##as, by the deliberations of the defense commission, or by the airfields provided from
Tampico to Tapachula. All of these might well have created dissension. But from the early wartime experience came a closer bond between the two
countries. The commendable combat record of the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron on Luzon, the Mexican airmen who gave their lives in the same cause for
which American fliers died, these were the true measure of the cooperation that began in 1941. There were indications that ties so strongly forged
would not be lightly dropped. Although the joint defense commission had not been formally designated as a permanent body, plans were made at a staff
conference in March 1945, at which the American members of the commission represented the United States, to continue the defense commission in the
postwar years. The mutual confidence and respect between the two countries that developed out of their wartime association are proof that the New
World can still serve as a beacon for the Old.
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ehall
Super Nomad
Posts: 1906
Registered: 3-29-2014
Location: Buckeye, Az
Member Is Offline
Mood: It's 5 o'clock somewhere
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What's all the dog food for Larry?
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8946
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Pole Line Road postponed due to injury
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Probably to help flatten the leaf springs to provide traction and help smooth out the ride.
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ehall
Super Nomad
Posts: 1906
Registered: 3-29-2014
Location: Buckeye, Az
Member Is Offline
Mood: It's 5 o'clock somewhere
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Home safe. Great trip.
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ChuckMRN
Newbie
Posts: 10
Registered: 3-15-2015
Member Is Offline
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glad you made it back safe. good meeting you, thanks for all the help.
chuck
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ehall
Super Nomad
Posts: 1906
Registered: 3-29-2014
Location: Buckeye, Az
Member Is Offline
Mood: It's 5 o'clock somewhere
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Thanks Chuck. Nice meeting you and your awesome jeep. Welcome to the site.
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8946
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Pole Line Road postponed due to injury
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Thanks Ed and Chuck for navigation help and towing helP. It was a great run with lots to talk about! Both of your Jeeps are top-notch!
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norte
Super Nomad
Posts: 1163
Registered: 10-8-2008
Member Is Offline
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Whats all this stuff about towing? What happened?
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elgatoloco
Ultra Nomad
Posts: 4332
Registered: 11-19-2002
Location: Yes
Member Is Offline
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I suspect you will find out. Eventually. Or not. 
MAGA
Making Attorneys Get Attorneys
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8946
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Pole Line Road postponed due to injury
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Baja Pole Line Run Press Release
I better not forget to mention all of the other tow rigs:
TW - Tacoma Tow Taco award!
John M. - Tacoma Tow Taco
Ryan - Chevy Blazer Tow rig
BajaTrailRider - Diesel Nissan Tow rig
MICK - towee and Tow Truck operator
Ed Hall - RUBICON Tow Jeep
Harald P. - M BENZ winch operator running VIKING WINCH cable.
HUITZI - RUBICON Tow Jeep
Photos to follow...
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8946
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Pole Line Road postponed due to injury
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Any word on Will and the status of his run to MICK's house last night???
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MICK
Nomad
Posts: 499
Registered: 11-12-2003
Location: Rio Hardy
Member Is Offline
Mood: livin the good life on the river
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Drove the ranger all the way back no problem. In shop now getting new stuff in the tranny. Got Will back to the house and got a new distributor from a
friend. Had a great carnitas dinner prepared by penny also some great conversation. Got up this morning installed a used dust. And module. After some
trick wiring. Will and Larry left about noon hope they got home
Mick
Getting there is ALL the fun!
Ok being here is fun to
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David K
Honored Nomad
Posts: 64852
Registered: 8-30-2002
Location: San Diego County
Member Is Offline
Mood: Have Baja Fever
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Wonderful!
When TW, Frigatebird and I reached the wells after our Arroyo Grande hikes, the man there said 10 Jeeps had come by the day before. I could only
imagine the hell you went through going via Ejido Saldaña only to find it washed out and have to double back and use Arroyo Grande route instead!!??
Harald (4x4ABC) and Karl (Fernwah) tried to head back to La Paz via the upper end of Arroyo Grande and out to Hwy. 3... so we parted at Arroyo D
Saturday morning about 10:30.
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ehall
Super Nomad
Posts: 1906
Registered: 3-29-2014
Location: Buckeye, Az
Member Is Offline
Mood: It's 5 o'clock somewhere
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It was kind of funny seeing it on the GPS. The washes were only about 3 or 4 miles apart but are completely different. The arroyo grande was mostly
smooth sand but the one we went down was full of rocks of all sizes and shapes.
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bajatrailrider
Super Nomad
Posts: 2432
Registered: 1-24-2015
Location: Mexico
Member Is Offline
Mood: Happy
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We made it back Thanks to Mick,Penn,Ryan and the whole group.Mick found parts,towed him,fixed him,housed us,Dinner,breakfast.They have a real nice
place.Wil is here now,He has million thanks.We had a blast,thanks for having us.The best part was towing Wil in the sand wash,with the little
Nissan.We where laughing so hard towing him so fast. Everybody on trail ride good people.
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Ken Cooke
Elite Nomad
Posts: 8946
Registered: 2-9-2004
Location: Riverside, CA
Member Is Offline
Mood: Pole Line Road postponed due to injury
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I'm glad to hear everyone made it back okay. What a rush! Watching you guys with that tow strap, winch lines, etc. It was crazy out there all
weekend. Crazy fun!
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