BajaNews
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Tijuana's New Calm Shows Benefits of Local Policing in Mexico
http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/2672-tijuan...
Written by Nathan Jones
24 May 2012
The leading candidates in Mexico's presidential election all emphasize the need for a more centralized police force in order to combat organized
crime, but the case of Tijuana suggests that strong local police may be far more effective in reducing drug-related violence.
Enrique Pena Nieto (PRI), the candidate favored to win the Mexican Presidency has argued for the creation of a paramilitary force of 40,000 former
soldiers to combat drug cartels in the country. While this force is built, he would continue to use the Military to maintain order and combat drug
cartels. Josefina Vasquez Mota (PAN) has stated that she will continue the efforts of the current president Felipe Calderon (PAN) and emphasize the
role of the national police force. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of the leftist PRD has stated that he too would continue to rely on the military in the
fight against organized crime. In a recent debate he referred to the military as “indispensable,” but wanted to establish a more experienced national
police force so that the army could return to its barracks.
All of these arguments in favor of increased law enforcement centralization ignore Mexico’s one success story: Tijuana. Tijuana is the only place in
Mexico where drug-related violence has surged and subsequently fallen to pre-conflict levels. While the government response cannot take full credit
for the reduction in violence, it most certainly played a role, and that effort was not led by a federal police force.
Violence in Tijuana surged in 2008 as the Tijuana Cartel, also known as the Arellano Felix Organization, fractured due to internecine conflict. One
faction led by Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental, alias “El Teo," favored kidnapping. The other, led by Fernando Sanchez Arellano, alias “El Ingeniero,”
emphasized drug trafficking. El Ingeniero’s faction demanded a reduction in kidnappings in April 2008 which was rejected by El Teo and the resulting
conflict led to high levels of violence.
The government response, known as Operation Tijuana, was a coordinated effort led by the military and Municipal Police with the broad support of civil
society. Because white collar professionals were often the main victims of the El Teo faction kidnappings, the city's professional associations
demanded a strong unified response.
Many have argued that pacts were created between the police and cartels to eliminate the Teo faction. This may have been the case. But if Mexico’s
leaders have an interest in reducing violence as they claim to, Tijuana appears to be a model. Local police forces in coordination with the military
were able to eliminate the most violent cartel -- possibly with the support of less violent cartels -- and thus reduce overall levels of violence. A
similar strategy arguing for the targeting of the most violent Mexican cartels on a national scale has been put forth by Eric Olson of the Woodrow
Wilson center.
The municipal police under the leadership of Julian Leyzaola, a “tough guy” army colonel, began a process of purging corrupted police officers
affiliated with the Teo Faction. This purge may have included the use of torture on Tijuana police officers.
With the January 2010 arrest of El Teo and the subsequent arrests of his top lieutenants, the Teo faction was eliminated from the city; though many of
its former cells were annexed by the Sinaloa cartel. The organized crime terrain in the city now appears to include a truce between the Sinaloa Cartel
and the Arellano Felix Organization led by El Ingeniero. This new equilibrium could not have been achieved without the coordination of the municipal
police force, the military and civil society.
As the following figures compiled from the Secretaria de Seguridad Publica website demonstrate, violence has subsequently returned to pre-conflict
levels.
Tijuana’s Municipal Police force was strong enough to achieve this reduction in violence because it had received increased funding for salaries,
training, equipment and infrastructure from the previous Mayoral administration of Jorge Hank Rhon (PRI). This funding was a critical precondition for
its success.
Some Mexico scholars like ITAM Professor Denise Dresser have pointed to the increases in violence in locales where the military is used to fight
cartels, a point she made at a recent talk at the University of San Diego. The dominant narrative is that the military kills the leaders of these
cartels and cartel lieutenants fight amongst each other for control leading to higher violence levels. Dresser counters that something bigger is at
play. The entry of the military is usually accompanied by the removal of local police forces, which are viewed as corrupt and in league with
traffickers. She argues that for all of the corruption of local police forces, they know and understand the local conditions and can better manage
violence. Further, federal troops, provide order that is too “intermittent” to result in a lasting peace.
The Tijuana example, where municipal police forces played an important role in reducing violence, appears to support Dresser’s argument. The
fascination of Mexican political elite with a national police force may thus be misguided. If the goal is the reduction of violence, Mexican efforts
might be more efficacious if they provide support, funding and capacity-building to local police forces.
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BajaBruno
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While I'm sure Dr. Dresser has good intentions, she is a political scientist, not a criminologist. The reduction in violence in Tijuana may have much
more to do with the removal of Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental and the subsequent uneasy truce between the Tijuana Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel,
rather than any change in policing. The idea that the Tijuana Municipal Police produced a forced reduction in violence after being infused with cash
sounds like a hollow, chest-beating plea for even more money, little of which is likely to achieve much of anything.
If "pacts [] created between the police and cartels" (al la PRI days) is a "model" for Mexico, then it is clear that some in Mexico believe drug
trafficking is a consumer-side problem rather than a producer-side problem. While there may be some twisted logic to that idea, Mexico is not likely
to escape cartel violence and restore its reputation by coddling murderers, any more than the U.S. would have by ignoring the Mafia.
Christopher Bruno, Elk Grove, CA.
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