I will look forward to the trip report.
Doing that trip (by accident) once was enough for me. Beautiful country but near the limits of my little Tacoma. Some scary off-camber, boulder
choked, HolyCr*pWhatTheFDidIGetInto moments. However, seeing the video, I'm really glad I did not have a full-size vehicle.
Truth generally lies in the coordination of antagonistic opinions
-Herbert Spencer
Originally posted by edm1
That Wrong Way Enmedio looks worse/difficult than our Mision Sta Maria Widowmaker run in 2010.
[Edited on 10-10-2013 by edm1]
Taking the wrong way down Cañon Enmedio past Neal Johns' Basketball Hill is much worse than the "Mission Impossible" trail. Especially, with the new
Basketball Hill bypass you must take to go around a downed boulder sitting in the middle of the trail. TW's Toyota pickup drove up and around it
without breaking a sweat. Your big rig might have some difficulties, though.
New Currie steering, Daystar bushings, Crown steering arm - INSTALLED! The Jeep is now road-worthy, and made the commute 2x this week! BAJA, WE'RE
READY!!
November 23rd through 26th, I will be hosting a run along the 1942 Pole Line Road. The history of this region is quite fascinating. This short
article that I wrote in 2006 describes the topography and flora of this magical region about 100 miles south of the Calexico, CA area. Feel free to
email me with questions you may have of this region.
In 1942, a communications road was constructed from coastal Ensenada , Mexico to the sleepy fishing village of San Felipe , Mexico . It was
feared that in 1942, Japanese submarines would attack the United States by first gaining control of the upper Sea of Cortez and possibly all of Baja ,
California . President Roosevelt had already launched the construction of the Alaskan Highway , and had offered the Mexican government assistance in
building a transpeninsular roadway linking Ensenada to the southern-most reaches of the Baja peninsula. At that time, the Mexican government did not
see the use for a transpeninsular highway. Instead, a rock-lined route was constructed that would aid in the installation of a telephone line that
would connect military personnel in Ensenada to San Felipe, and vice-versa.
This telephone route travels the width of Baja , California alongside what is now Highway 3. The telephone line breaks away from this highway as
the forested Sierra Juarez escarpment drops in elevation to meet the desert environs down below.
The Pole Line trail begins at the intersection of a Smoke Tree-lined wash, and a rock-lined trail which climbs atop a heavily vegetated mesa.
Covering approximately 150 miles from start to finish, the Pole Line trail contains several washouts, obstacles, and off-camber hillclimbs.
Maintenance has been sparse at best over the past 71 years to this road. Stock-height SUVs were able to travel the entire length - 150 miles,
although they spend more time picking their lines through rock-lined arroyos than soaking in the unusual geography.
Traveling along the start of the Pole Line trail, the scenery unfolds with striking scenery which features wildflowers, red soils, and rocky
buttes stretching up into the skyline. Flowers jet prominently from the tops of: Mojave Yucca, Barrel Cactii, Buckhorn Cholla, Salvia, Desert Mallow,
and the numerous Brittlebush that dotted the hillsides along this scenic trail.
Approximately 94 miles south from where drivers pick up the dirt trail for this run along Highway 2 lies one of the sole remaining cobblestone
sections of road to be found. This section of the Pole Line road travels along the east slope of the Canyon Enmedio. Although the Baja Almanac
erroneously shows the road traveling along the western slope, the distance is off by only 50’-60’ with the route clearly snaking through a
boulder-lined riverbed. After a narrow 3 foot waterfall section carries the driver further downstream with canyon walls narrowing gradually, the
moderate climb nicknamed ‘Basketball Hill’ by veteran Baja ‘wheeler and Author Neal Johns awaits. Neal racked up $1,600.00 in body damage as one of
the round; basketball-sized rocks creased the rockers of his Toyota Tacoma during an exploratory trek through this region several years ago. It was
Johns’ that rediscovered this route and introduced it to scores of Baja enthusiasts in a back-issue of the Discover Baja newsletter. He was inspired
by a side-trip written by Gerhard and Gulick’s Lower California Guidebook (1958).
‘Basketball Hill’ climbs a smooth, narrow arroyo that although steep in places only requires a good limited slip and All-Terrain tires aired down
for adequate traction. This section of trail climbs in elevation to only 1,833 feet before continuing over a saddle to the picturesque Canyon
Jaquegel. There, a spring-fed palm oasis awaits travelers with plenty of camping and hiking opportunities. Although these springs appear to flow
year-round, it is advisable not to venture into this region in the late spring through summer months when triple-digit heat can easily dehydrate an
unprepared traveler. These environs do produce freezing winter nighttime temperatures, so, late fall and early spring present the most pleasant
conditions for this type of back country travel.
Continuing along the final leg of this route, the driver must discern a route which climbs in and out of sandy washes, and around rocky bypasses.
Here is where the last remaining telephone poles can be seen, although the driving becomes the most challenging of this entire journey. Although
traveling from Canyon Jaquegel to Highway 5 along the Pole Line road can appear to be deceptive, the Baja Almanac provides a visible route that can be
followed in a high-clearance 4WD pickup or SUV. This road ends at a simple ‘T’ intersection, with washouts preventing easy passage along both
northern and southern routes. Here is where a lift, 31” or taller tires, and a traction-aiding device will come in handy. After utilizing a steep
bypass route into the boulder-shrewn arroyo, GPS waypoint data will provide the most direct route across this maze of rock piles. With careful
travel, the 2WD dirt road leading to Tres Pozos and Ejido Saldana will be reached with Highway 5 not much farther in the distance.
This region of Baja California is extremely remote with just a handful of ranches in operation within the area. Spare parts are at best a day
away. Cooling systems, suspensions and tires are particularly vulnerable along this unimproved route. Water sources exist, but difficult terrain
must be traveled to the cold springs that I am aware of within the upper reaches of Cañon Jaquegel as well as near the beginning of the Pole Line
Road.
-Ken Cooke
The Pole Line Road (Datum is WGS84)
GPS Waypoints to show the way.
Originally posted by redmesa
Holy Cow, that is one off road path. I sure there is a history behind it that I have missed out on. Thanks David.
There are big threads on it and the history, here on Nomad... I even found details on the American Radar Station the phone line went to, near San
Felipe... Punta Estrella used to be called Punta Radar (next to Punta Diggs)... at least from one source. There's a story online from a guy who was a
kid riding with his dad to San Felipe in WWII taking food supplies to the U.S. base there... long dirt drive from Calexico!
American concern for the security of Mexico was intimately related to the extent and proximity of any threat to United States territory. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the security of Baja California became a matter of acute interest to the United States. Just as lend-lease was a manifestation
of American interest in the security of Mexico, so the measures taken by General DeWitt and General Card##as, singly and jointly for the defense of
the United States' southwest and Mexico's northwest were concrete expressions of Mexican cooperation in the defense of the United States.
There were three fields of activity in which the defense of California involved joint action with Mexico: first, the placing of aircraft detector
stations in Baja California; second, the building of airfields and highways there; and third, the formulation of joint plans by General DeWitt and
General Card##as.
The proposal to establish radar stations in Baja California grew out of a study made by the GHQ Air Force early in 1941, disclosing that vital areas
in the southwest, near the Mexican boundary, could not be adequately covered either by a ground observation system or by radar detectors in American
territory.
"An enemy desiring to attack Southern California," a later Air Forces report stated, "may be expected to be aware of the limitations of our Aircraft
Warning Service, and will make his approach over or from Mexican territory. " 74 The Air Forces therefore recommended taking steps to obtain Mexico's
permission to establish at least two detector stations in Baja California.
These views were brought to the attention of the War Plans Division sometime in April. Without denying the merits of the proposal, the War Plans
Division informed the Army Air Forces that the moment was not propitious for discussing the subject with the Mexican staff representatives, then in
Washington.
The Air Forces continued to agitate the matter during the next three months, only to receive the same reply: "The War Department considers it
inadvisable to submit to the Mexican representatives a request to station detachments of U.S. Army armed and uniformed forces in Mexican territory, as
it is convinced that the Mexican Government would reject such a request at this time." 75 In framing the War Plans Division reply, Colonel Ridgway,
then serving as one of the American staff representatives, noted, "there is no probability of securing Mexican consent . . . at least until an Axis
attack is delivered or imminent." 76
No action was taken until 3 December 1941, four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when the American staff representatives presented their
Mexican colleagues with a proposal for an immediate reconnaissance of Sonora and Baja California for the purpose of locating sites for radar stations.
Although it was agreed that the necessity of using the installations might never arise, the American representatives nevertheless proposed that the
preliminary steps be taken at once and that small mixed groups of United States officers and Mexicans, in civilian clothes, should survey the area
within two hundred miles of the border for access roads and radar sites.77
An appeal on 8 December brought a reply from President Avila Camacho the same day giving full permission to make the reconnaissance and install the
radar stations. To the original purpose the Air Staff had, however, added that of investigating rumors of Japanese airfields and fuel caches. A
separate party under Maj. A. P. Ebright conducted the Air Staff survey, entering Mexico on 16 December. An attempt by the War Department to identify
the Ebright mission with the radar station reconnaissance no doubt contributed to the initial confusion and suspicion that attended it.78
Although no signs of enemy activity were uncovered, the Ebright party remained in Mexico until the end of January to investigate suitable sites for
landing fields, to report on the availability of water and other supplies along the route of communications from the border south, and in general to
add to the Army's store of information about the area.79 As the immediate post-Pearl Harbor frenzy subsided and as the scope and positions of the
Ebright mission became clarified,
General DeWitt's Western Defense Command headquarters gave it firmer support against the continued skepticism at the headquarters of the Southern
California Sector.80 Meanwhile, other groups had crossed the border, and had tentatively chosen sites for radar detector stations at Punta
Salispuedes, 20 miles northwest of Ensenada; Punta San Jacinto, 125 miles south of Ensenada; and Punta Diggs on the northeast coast of the peninsula.
With all this activity going on, the issue that had threatened the negotiations over staging fields the previous summer-whether Mexico would permit
the entry and stationing of armed and uniformed American soldiers promised to become a hardy perennial. On the earlier occasion, it had been solved by
accepting the Mexican position, and when the proposal for the reconnaissance of Baja California was presented to the staff representatives on 3
December the wearing of civilian clothes by the soldiers making the survey was accepted by the American representatives as inescapable.
The first draft of the instructions for `the reconnaissance, drawn up on 9 December for the Chief of the Army Air Forces, stated, "United States
personnel will be limited to officers and they will wear civilian clothing," but at the suggestion of G-2, and with the concurrence of Colonel
Ridgway, this particular restriction was deleted.81
Because of the United States' belligerent status, it was no longer appropriate. General DeWitt was especially insistent that no soldiers cross into
Mexico unless in uniform and armed, but the point was not raised with Mexican representatives in Washington.
Consequently, the Ebright group was turned back at the border and not permitted to cross until the men changed into civilian clothing and left their
weapons behind. Sometimes, depending on the attitude of the local Mexican commanders, American parties were permitted to enter the country in uniform,
but never under arms, and not even the excellent personal relations that existed between General DeWitt and General Card##as could bring about a
definite acceptance of the American view.
The War Department as well as the Department of State took the position that, unsatisfactory though it might be to send American soldiers into Mexico
in civilian clothes and without arms, to arrive at an impasse with Mexico and risk having permission to install the radar sets refused would be even
more undesirable.
Accordingly, on 20 December General DeWitt was authorized to accede to Mexican wishes in the matter. His efforts to obtain a less dangerous and more
face-saving solution continued but met with slight success.82 After the summer of 1942 this particular issue ceased to be a matter of record. The
establishment of the radar stations, a diminution of American activity in Baja California, and the withdrawal of American personnel were probably
responsible.
Two of the radar stations were set up and began operations during the first week in June 1942 and the third a month later. At each, one officer and
twenty-five enlisted men were stationed to operate the set and train Mexican military personnel in its use.
The equipment itself was turned over to the Mexican Army under lend-lease. By the end of August the Mexican troops had taken over the operation of the
sets, and the Americans had withdrawn except for a small detachment of five men and one officer at each station.83
The coverage provided by the three sets was far from complete, but even as early as October 1942 the War Department was breathing more easily and saw
no need to install additional equipment. 84
By the summer of 1943 retrenchment had become the order of the day in Baja California. All Americans were withdrawn from the radar stations except for
one officer and three enlisted men, who were left in Ensenada primarily for liaison purposes. All requests for additional equipment had to be refused.
By mid-May 1944 the Commanding General, Fourth Air Force, reported that he no longer considered the three radar stations necessary for the defense of
California and, much to the dismay of both Navies, who wished to have the sets in operation for air-sea rescue work, operations ceased about the first
of June.
When, at a meeting of the defense commission, Admiral Johnson protested against a Mexican Army proposal to move the equipment to Mexico City, General
Henry was obliged to state that the War Department's policy of retrenchment remained unchanged but that there would be no objection to the Navy's
supplying and maintaining the operation of the sets.
For the remainder of the war, the Army had no further responsibility in the matter. One station resumed operation with gasoline and oil supplied by
the Navy. The other two were moved away.85
During the two years they had been in operation, the stations performed a useful function. They had closed all but a small gap in the network around
the San Diego-Los Angeles area. Anticipated language difficulties failed to materialize to any great extent, and valuable training in the use of
highly technical equipment was given our Mexican ally.
As part of the general scheme of filling in the gaps in the defenses of California after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Fourth Air Force had strongly
urged the building of three landing fields for pursuit planes in Baja California and two staging fields, one near Rosario and the other near La Paz.
Time, and authority to use the fields for operations, were the important considerations. Both the War Department and the joint defense commission,
when formally constituted, were agreed upon the desirability of the proposal, which the commission adopted as its Fourth Recommendation on 10 April
1942.86
After some backing and filling a joint survey got well under way and recommended three sites as primary airdromes-El Cipres, six miles south of
Ensenada; Camalu, just south of San Jacinto; and Trinidad, about eighteen miles south of La Ventura. 87
Later, four other fields were surveyed. For three weeks at the end of June and in early July the War Department, on the advice of the joint defense
commission, called a halt to all activity in connection with the airfields in order to give Mexican opinion time to crystallize and to give General
Card##as an opportunity to make a decision.
After authority was given to proceed with the plans and estimates for the original five airfields, General Card##as and especially General Juan Felipe
Rico, the local Mexican commander, took hold of the project with enthusiasm and pushed not only the airfields but also a connecting highway down the
peninsula.
General DeWitt promised any help in materials and equipment that General Rico might need. The United States, General DeWitt thought, was committed to
assist both projects, the roads as well as the airfields.88
By the beginning of 1943, the War Department had begun to cool, although the Fourth Air Force still urged that the three northern fields, at El
Cipres, Camalu, and Trinidad, be constructed and tied to San Diego by connecting roads. In March the War Department rejected General Rico's request
for materials and equipment for the construction of the airfields.
The Mexican section of the joint commission thus found itself in the position, in August, of arguing in favor of the United States Army undertaking a
defense construction project on Mexican soil, while the American section was opposed. With the War Department unwilling to provide the construction
materials because of the urgent needs of more active theaters of operations, the discussion became academic.89
In the field of joint planning, the Mexican experience took a contrary course to that of Canadian-United States planning. In the case of the latter a
basic plan was drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board, and local joint plans, more detailed and specific, were subsequently completed in accordance
with its general principles.
With Mexico, on the other hand, the only joint plan completed during the war was the DeWitt-Card##as plan of February-March 1942 for the defense of
the Pacific coastal region. When later the joint defense commission undertook to draw up a plan, two of the members-Admiral Johnson and General
Castillo Najera-understood that the commission was supposed to base its plan on the DeWitt-Card##as agreements.
A casual observer would perhaps have seen little in the local situation to indicate much success for the Western Defense Command planners. The local
Mexican commanders either were uncertain of their authority to commit the federal government or were reluctant to accept instructions from Mexico
City; the difficulties and delays in obtaining full permission for a reconnaissance in Baja California were inauspicious. But such an observer would
have been wrong. Actually, the Mexican commanders made clear their willingness and desire to cooperate, and if they were reluctant to place their
names to a document committing them to joint action, they made it plain by word of mouth that in an emergency they would call on General DeWitt to
send American troops into Mexico.
In its final shape the plan represented a compromise between an earlier draft drawn up by General DeWitt's headquarters and one presented by General
Card##as.90 It provided for the patrol and defense of the two coastal areas-Mexican and American-by the forces of the respective countries, for an
exchange of information between the two forces, and for the passage of troops of either country through the territory of the other; and it permited
the forces of either country to operate in the other, in uniform and under arms. There were several provisions that failed to meet with the approval
of General Card##as.
The Mexican commander could not agree to the control and operation of airfields and radar stations in Mexico by American personnel, and insisted that
the forces of one country operating in the territory of the other be under the commander in whose area they were operating.91
Both generals agreed that the plan was sound from a "military standpoint" and that "the question from a nationalistic standpoint is one for the
decision of the two governments." 92 The points on which the two commanders could not agree were accordingly turned over to the joint defense
commission.
The American section thought it best to defer consideration of a general, basic plan until such specific matters as the radar stations and airfields
were agreed upon, and when the draft of a basic plan was presented by Col. Lemuel Mathewson at the meeting of 21 April 1942, it was patterned after
the Canada-United States Basic Defense Plan of 1940.93
Little progress had been made when Admiral Johnson, becoming chairman of the American section, suggested a fresh start and a new approach. This was in
December 1942. The new scheme-to draw up a plan of collaboration, in ratification of the agreements reached by the commission, instead of a defense
plan-was no more easily agreed upon than the old.
General Henry, recently appointed senior Army member, took over the job of drafting a new plan in collaboration with General Alamillo of the Mexican
section. Discussion during the meetings the following summer and fall reveal what seem to be a measure of impatience and perhaps satiation. The
question of command proved to be the stumbling block, and by April 1944 General Henry was ready to abandon the attempt to write an acceptable plan.
Finally, after more than two years of effort, the commission decided upon a "statement of general principles . . . which might serve as a basis for
other plans of collaboration between any two nations." 94
In a broader sense, the wartime collaboration between the United States and Mexico cannot be measured adequately by the activity in Baja California,
by the joint planning of General DeWitt and General Card##as, by the deliberations of the defense commission, or by the airfields provided from
Tampico to Tapachula. All of these might well have created dissension. But from the early wartime experience came a closer bond between the two
countries.
The commendable combat record of the Mexican 201st Fighter Squadron on Luzon, the Mexican airmen who gave their lives in the same cause for which
American fliers died, these were the true measure of the cooperation that began in 1941.
There were indications that ties so strongly forged would not be lightly dropped. Although the joint defense commission had not been formally
designated as a permanent body, plans were made at a staff conference in March 1945, at which the American members of the commission represented the
United States, to continue the defense commission in the postwar years. The mutual confidence and respect between the two countries that developed out
of their wartime association are proof that the New World can still serve as a beacon for the Old.
“The first trip I made to San Felipe in Mexico was to deliver dairy products to the Army radar station in the spring of 1942.
“Sometime, in about April I think, my dad pulled me out of the second grade, and we got into a 1938 Dodge truck and headed for San Felipe.
“The truck was filled with milk, butter, eggs, cheese and ice cream and we were headed for the army ‘base’ at San Felipe.
“Because of the war, there was a 35 m.p.h. speed limit, and we spent the night at Calexico, at the Anza Hotel, I think.
“We got up early the next morning. I don't remember having to stop going in either direction at the border. We crossed at Calexico and it was marked
as the border, but I don't think there was any official border activity.
“We were not far out of town, across the border, when we were stopped at the first of maybe four check points before we reached San Felipe. These
stops were manned by American soldiers, not Mexicans.
“My dad explained that we were going to a military installation in San Felipe that had just been built, and what it did was listen for airplanes using
something called ‘radar.’ In the last six months, the Army had built a paved road to San Felipe called the ‘radar road’ which made the drive south a
lot easier than it had been, unlike the month-long ordeal of mud and flood up until 1942.
“What we drive on today is the ‘radar road,’ although it has been paved a couple of times since then.
“I may be the only person to remember driving on that stretch of road during World War II who is still alive today. I can remember, the water was
right up to the road's edge in places, and my dad said that if it were not for the road, we'd have to wait for the tides to change and for the mud to
dry out.
“The ‘base’ was near where the old icehouse was until recently, and we were stopped from driving into the main area. About 20 young soldiers came out
to the barbed-wire fence and had the truck unloaded in a very short time, and we turned right around and headed home.”
American WWII Air Defense Radar Stations
(1942 - 1943), State of Baja California (Norte)
During the early years of WWII the U.S. Army built and manned at least three SCR-270 early warning anti-aircraft radar stations along the coast of
Baja California Norte, operated by the 654th AWS Company, to protect the southern approaches to San Diego, California.
Known sites include Station B-92 at Punta Salispuedes, located 22 miles northwest of Ensenada (later moved to Alasitos, 36 miles south of Tijuana);
Station B-94 at Punta San Jacinto, 60 miles south of Ensenada; and Station B-97 at Punta Estrella (Diggs), south of San Felipe on the Gulf of
California (aka Sea of Cortez).
"If it were lush and rich, one could understand the pull, but it is fierce and hostile and sullen.
The stone mountains pile up to the sky and there is little fresh water. But we know we must go back
if we live, and we don't know why." - Steinbeck, Log from the Sea of Cortez
"People don't care how much you know, until they know how much you care." - Theodore Roosevelt
"You can easily judge the character of others by how they treat those who they think can do nothing for them or to them." - Malcolm Forbes
"Let others lead small lives, but not you. Let others argue over small things, but not you. Let others
cry over small hurts, but not you. Let others leave their future in someone else's hands, but not you." - Jim Rohn
"The best way to get the right answer on the internet is not to ask a question; it's to post the wrong answer." - Cunningham's Law
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Mexico InsuranceServices for your long-term support of the BajaNomad.com Forums site.
Emergency Baja Contacts Include:
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